Generalizations of Cantor's theorem in ZF

Author(s):  
Guozhen Shen
Keyword(s):  
2001 ◽  
Vol 32 (2) ◽  
pp. 122
Author(s):  
Shay Gueron
Keyword(s):  

1996 ◽  
Vol 42 (1) ◽  
pp. 446-448 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dario Maguolo ◽  
Silvio Valentini

2011 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 337-352 ◽  
Author(s):  
B. K. Lahiri ◽  
Pratulananda Das ◽  
Lakshmi Kanta Dey

1986 ◽  
Vol 32 (13-16) ◽  
pp. 221-226 ◽  
Author(s):  
Z. Šikić
Keyword(s):  

1970 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 211-223
Author(s):  
Martin Lembke

Although recent evidence is somewhat ambiguous, if not confusing, Patrick Grim still seems to believe that his Cantorian argument against omniscience is sound. According to this argument, it follows by Cantor’s power set theorem that there can be no set of all truths. Hence, assuming that omniscience presupposes pre- cisely such a set, there can be no omniscient being. Reconsidering this argument, however, guided in particular by Alvin Plantinga’s critique thereof, I find it far from convincing. Not only does it have an enormously untoward side effect, but it is self-referentially incoherent as well.


2021 ◽  
pp. 30-52
Author(s):  
Salvatore Florio ◽  
Øystein Linnebo

Traditional analyses of plurals tended to eliminate plural expressions in favor of singular ones. These “singularist” analyses have recently faced many objections, which are intended to provide indirect support for the alternative analysis provided by plural logic. This chapter evaluates four such objections and concludes that they are less compelling than is often assumed. This conclusion is borne out by a close examination of various plural versions of Cantor’s theorem.


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