Does CEO pay slice reflect poor corporate governance?

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ugur Lel ◽  
Mete Tepe
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Ceo Pay

Pay-performance sensitivity and corporate governance mechanisms: evidence from Tunisia

2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Meriem Ghrab ◽  
Marjène Gana ◽  
Mejda Dakhlaoui
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Firm Performance ◽  
Pay For Performance ◽  
Simultaneous Equation ◽  
Executive Pay ◽  
Estimation Model ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Explanatory Variables ◽  
Performance Sensitivity ◽  
Ceo Pay

Purpose The purpose of this study is to analyze the CEO compensation sensitivity to firm performance, termed as the pay-for-performance sensitivity (PPS) in the Tunisian context and to test the robustness of this relationship when corporate governance (CG) mechanisms are considered. Design/methodology/approach The consideration of past executive pay as one of the explanatory variables makes this estimation model a dynamic one. Furthermore, to avoid the problem of endogeneity, this study uses the system-GMM estimator developed by Blundell and Bond (1998). For robustness check, this study aims to use a simultaneous equation approach (three-stage least squares [3SLS]) to estimate the link between performance and CEO pay with a set of CG mechanisms to control for possible simultaneous interdependencies. Findings Using a sample of 336 firm-years from Tunisia over the 2009–2015 periods, this study finds strong evidence that the pay-performance relationship is insignificant and negative, and it becomes more negative or remains insignificant after introducing CG mechanisms consistently with the managerial power approach. The findings are robust to the use of alternative performance measures. This study provides new empirical evidence that CEOs of Tunisian firms abuse extracting rents independently of firm performance. Originality/value This study contributes to the unexamined research on PPS in a frontier market. This study also shows the ineffectiveness of the Tunisian CG structure and thus recommends for the legislator to impose a mandatory CG guide.

Compensation Disclosures and Corporate Governance through Shareholder Voting

2019 ◽  
Vol 32 (3) ◽  
pp. 27-48 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brian Cadman ◽  
Richard Carrizosa ◽  
Xiaoxia Peng
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Fair Value ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Shareholder Voting ◽  
Compensation Committee ◽  
The Public ◽  
Equity Compensation ◽  
Ceo Pay ◽  
Jel Classifications

ABSTRACT There are several measures of equity compensation that may provide shareholders with distinct and useful information for evaluating CEO pay. We examine whether shareholders consider additional disclosures of equity compensation measures beyond the grant date fair value when participating in corporate governance. We find that CEO equity compensation expense, a distinct measure of equity compensation, is a determinant of shareholder voting for management sponsored equity plans and voting for directors that serve on the compensation committee. After controlling for ISS recommendations, we find that voting outcomes remain significantly related to abnormal equity compensation expense. Consistent with shareholders considering the equity compensation expense, we document that firms shorten equity compensation vesting periods when they are no longer required to disclose the equity compensation expense. Our findings suggest that shareholders rely on multiple, distinct measures of equity compensation when participating in corporate governance. JEL Classifications: M12; M52; G34. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text.

scholarly journals A Literature Review of the Perspectives of CEO Pay: An Analysis of Issues and Controversies

2018 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 44
Author(s):  
Faitira Manuere ◽  
Precious Hove
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Literature Review ◽  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Ceo Compensation ◽  
Executive Pay ◽  
The Core ◽  
Good Corporate Governance ◽  
Ceo Pay ◽  
Conceptual Background

The purpose of this paper is to review the literature on various theories that are used in organisations today to determine executive compensation. This paper analyses the relevance of the theories that are used to determine CEO compensation in modern corporations. The paper makes an attempt to review extensively the literature on CEO compensation. This paper looks at the concerns of sixteen theories of executive compensation. This paper further analyses the special features that are associated with CEO pay. These features help us to understand the problems that experts on executive pay experience when they try to define the exact CEO pay when compared to other rewards that are non financial. The drivers of executive pay are quantified and qualified in order to provide the conceptual background needed to understand the core factors that determine executive pay. Therefore the role of institutional investors in driving managerial salary is explored in detail. Finally, the effects of firm size and good corporate governance on executive pay are carefully analysed.

scholarly journals The Upward Redistribution of Income

2016 ◽  
Vol 48 (4) ◽  
pp. 529-543 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dean Baker
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Financial Sector ◽  
Ceo Pay

This paper examines the extent to which the growth in rents can explain the upward redistribution in income since 1980. It examines and provides preliminary estimates for the growth of rents in four main areas: increased patent and copyright rents, the growth of the financial sector, the increase in CEO pay due to the failure of the corporate governance, and the increase in pay for the most highly paid professionals due to protectionist barriers.

scholarly journals Lessons learned from CEO pay and market cap performance in the mining and metals industries: Implications for the board of directors and for corporate governance

2015 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 813-818
Author(s):  
Hugh Grove ◽  
Mac Clouse ◽  
Sharon Lassar
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Board Of Directors ◽  
Weighted Average ◽  
Simple Correlation ◽  
Market Capitalization ◽  
Ceo Pay ◽  
Correlation Tests ◽  
Compensation Packages ◽  
Total Market

CEO pay was correlated with market capitalization performance. Three simple correlation tests of 2013 total CEO pay with market capitalization destruction over the approximate three and one-half year period, January 2011 through July 2014, yielded a 66% weighted average moderate correlation for thirty-four companies. The total market cap destruction for these companies was an estimated $120.1 billion with total CEO pay of $224.6 million. Thus, total market cap destruction was approximately 535 times greater than total CEO pay. During this approximate three and one-half year time period, the S&P 500 Index increased 51.8%. Our simple correlation tests do not imply any causality. However, some corporate governance researchers (Kostyuk, 2014 and Hilb, 2008) have advocated: “Pay for Performance, not Presence” which could include such correlations as part of executive compensation packages from Board of Directors’ compensation committees. Claw-back provisions could be used for market capitalization destruction in evolving executive compensation packages.

scholarly journals Theory And Practice In CEO Pay: A Course Module And Integrative Case Based On Boeing Inc.

2012 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
pp. 245-260
Author(s):  
John F. Boschen ◽  
Kimberly J. Smith
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Ceo Compensation ◽  
Business Students ◽  
Theory And Practice ◽  
Financial Statement ◽  
Executive Pay ◽  
Capstone Course ◽  
Ceo Pay ◽  
Over Time ◽  
Case Based

Business students may dream of receiving pay packages like that of Michael Eisner at Disney. However, many of them will work for the compensation consultant who determines the economics of the pay arrangements, for the valuation consultant who values the different components of the pay arrangements, for the accountant who must audit the financial statement impacts of the pay arrangements, or as a manager in the company whose employees respond to the incentives provided by the pay arrangements. No matter their eventual role, it is critical that every student understands these various aspects of executive pay arrangements, and how these practices have evolved over time. The course module presented herein is designed to effectively integrate these perspectives in as few as five or as many as nine 80-minute sessions that could be a substantive component of an MBA or Master of Accounting capstone course, or a component of a corporate governance elective. A case based on the CEO compensation of Boeing Inc. over the last 60 years provides a series of assignments that effectively integrate the module.

scholarly journals Analyzing the business roundtable statement on the purpose of a corporation and linking it to corporate governance

2020 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 19-27 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hugh Grove ◽  
John Holcomb ◽  
Mac Clouse ◽  
Tracy Xu
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Financial Performance ◽  
Boards Of Directors ◽  
Performance Metrics ◽  
Sustainability Reporting ◽  
Major Purpose ◽  
Key Points ◽  
Ceo Pay ◽  
Business Roundtable ◽  
Version 2.0

The 2019 Business Roundtable Statement on the Purpose of a Corporation, endorsed by 183 CEOs of major U.S. companies, is not such a dramatic break from the past, but rather the next step in a steady retreat from a purely financial approach and an evolution to embrace a stakeholder approach, which is now gaining more and more lip service. The major purpose of this paper is to analyze this Business Roundtable Statement and relate it to three major corporate governance issues: CEO pay, non-financial performance metrics, and sustainability reporting. Then the paper introduces the Commonsense Corporate Governance Principles, which were initially published in 2016 and updated with Version 2.0 in 2018, sponsored by 21 CEOs of major U.S. companies. These Principles provide significant guidance and recommendations for corporations, boards of directors, shareholders, and other stakeholders to follow if they want to create an environment-friendly to meet the fundamental commitments in the Business Roundtable Statement. Accordingly, the major sections of this paper are introduction, CEO pay issues, non-financial performance metrics, sustainability reporting, corporate governance impacts, key points in both versions of the Commonsense Principles, key changes in the Commonsense Principles 2.0, discussion, and conclusions.

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