CEO
            horizon problem and characteristics of board of directors and compensation committee

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to analyze if the composition and activity of the appointment and remuneration committee have a significant effect in the remunerations of the members of the board of directors. Design/methodology/approach To achieve the paper's objective the authors proposed four hypotheses in order to analyze the repercussions of independent, institutional and executive directors in the Appointment and Retribution Committee (ARC) and its activity in the directors’ remunerations. Findings The results put into evidence that the composition (independent, institutional and executive members) of the ARC is not associated with the variation of the directors remuneration mean, while the activity of the ARC influences positively this remuneration mean, contrary to what was expected. Originality/value The ARC in Spain is not effective in fixating the directors’ remunerations. Propósito El objetivo de este artículo es analizar si la configuración y actividad de las comisiones de nombramientos y remuneraciones (CNR) tienen un efecto significativo en las remuneraciones de los miembros del consejo de administración. Diseño/metodología/enfoque Para alcanzar el objetivo del artículo hemos planteado cuatro hipótesis con la finalidad de analizar la repercusión de los consejeros independientes, dominicales y ejecutivos de las CNR y la actividad de las mismas en las remuneraciones de los consejeros. Hallazgos Los resultados ponen de manifiesto que la composición (miembros independientes, dominicales y ejecutivos) de las CNR no se asocian con la variación de las remuneraciones medias de los consejeros, mientras que la actividad de las CNR influye de manera positiva, contrario a lo pronosticado, en las variaciones de las retribuciones medias de los consejeros. Originalidad/valor Las CNR en España no son efectivas en la fijación de las retribuciones de los consejeros.

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Gender gaps at the top: Does board composition affect executive compensation?

Human Relations ◽

10.1177/0018726718809158 ◽

2018 ◽

Vol 72 (8) ◽

pp. 1292-1314 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Alison Cook ◽

Alicia R Ingersoll ◽

Christy Glass

Keyword(s):

Executive Compensation ◽

Board Of Directors ◽

Leadership Roles ◽

Pay Equity ◽

Board Diversity ◽

Compensation Committee ◽

Board Committees ◽

The Board Of Directors ◽

Top Executive ◽

Compensation Gap

Will adding women to the board of directors reduce firm gender pay disparities? Our research suggests ‘no’ … and ‘yes.’ It is not a matter of simply adding more women to the board or integrating women into key board committees that moves the needle. If firms really want to stimulate change through board diversity, then they need to empower female directors and place them in key leadership roles. We find that women’s integration on the board of directors and on the compensation committee has no significant impact on lessening the compensation gap within the top executive team. However, when women influence compensation decisions through service as the chair of the compensation committee, the top executive compensation gap is diminished. Our analysis relies on a dataset built by the authors of all top management team executives and board members from the S&P 500 from 2009–2013. We test three mechanisms that may enable women to overcome limitations with respect to pay equity: (i) integration, (ii) direct decision making and (iii) influence. Our findings suggest that not all types of power are equal; the more direct influence women have over compensation decisions, the smaller the compensation gap.

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Dialogue: CEO Compensation

Business Ethics Quarterly ◽

10.5840/beq201121441 ◽

2011 ◽

Vol 21 (4) ◽

pp. 679-691 ◽

Cited By ~ 4

Author(s):

Robert Kolb ◽

Jeffrey Moriarty

Keyword(s):

Board Of Directors ◽

Ceo Compensation ◽

Fiduciary Duty ◽

Market Process ◽

Minimum Level ◽

Compensation Committee ◽

The Board Of Directors ◽

Wage Negotiation

ABSTRACT:In this journal, Jeffrey Moriarty argued that CEOs must refuse to accept compensation above the minimum compensation that will induce them to accept and perform their jobs. Acting otherwise, he maintains, violates the CEO’s fiduciary duty, even for a CEO new to the firm. I argue that Moriarty’s conclusion rests on a failure to adequately distinguish when a person acts as a fiduciary from when she acts on her own account as a person. Further, Moriarty’s argument assumes that the CEO knows this minimum level of compensation. However, we learn the suitability of compensation only through the market process of wage negotiation, not through some process of introspection. I conclude that a CEO who abstains from interfering with the board of directors and its compensation committee is morally free to negotiate for the highest wage available.

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Board of Directors and CEO’s Compensation: The Case of Listed European Firms

Asian Social Science ◽

10.5539/ass.v17n1p107 ◽

2020 ◽

Vol 17 (1) ◽

pp. 107

Author(s):

Hani El-Chaarani ◽

Zouhour El-Abiad

Keyword(s):

United Kingdom ◽

Board Of Directors ◽

European Countries ◽

Board Size ◽

Ceo Duality ◽

Compensation Committee ◽

The Board Of Directors

The aim of this research is to assess the role of the board of directors in determining CEO’s compensation in the context of listed European companies for 3 fiscal years (2016-2017-2018). Based on a sample extracted from 11 European countries (France, Belgium, Germany, Italy, Spain, Ireland, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, United Kingdom and Netherlands), the results reveal the importance of board of directors characteristics in determining of CEO’s compensation. The board size, CEO duality, the presence of independents directors and the existence of compensation committee have been shown as determinants of CEO’s compensation.

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Incentive and Supervisory Contract between Special Committees and CEO Based on the Evolutionary Game Model

Mathematical Problems in Engineering ◽

10.1155/2020/4089634 ◽

2020 ◽

Vol 2020 ◽

pp. 1-17

Author(s):

Chuanbo Zhang ◽

Kangkang Lin ◽

Lei Wang

Keyword(s):

Board Of Directors ◽

Audit Committee ◽

Conflicts Of Interest ◽

Strategy Choice ◽

Game Model ◽

Special Committee ◽

Strategic Choices ◽

Compensation Committee ◽

The Board Of Directors ◽

Special Committees

The process of CEO incentive and supervision, in which the special committee plays an important role, has always been a hard problem to solve in modern corporate governance. Considering the conflicts of interest between the compensation committee, audit committee, and the CEO, this paper constructed a game model of incentive and supervision within the board of directors and analysed the strategic choices of all three and the influencing mechanisms in different contexts. The results show that there is no totally stable strategy point in the system and that there are different strategy choices in different situations; the CEO’s strategy choice is influenced by both the compensation committee and the audit committee, the incentive strategy of the compensation committee will promote the CEO’s self-interested behaviour, and the supervision strategy of the audit committee is inhibitive. The function of the special committee is dependent on its initial intention and the intensity of action. In the situation of excessive incentive by the compensation committee, the strategy choice of audit committee has periodicity, and the CEO and audit committee have periodic discretionary choice game. This study provides insight into the internal governance of the board of directors, particularly special committees, which create the incentive and supervisory contracts.

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