scholarly journals Are face masks a partisan issue during the COVID ‐19 pandemic? Differentiating political ideology and political party affiliation

Author(s):  
Matt C. Howard
2016 ◽  
Vol 62 (4) ◽  
pp. 797-818 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Balliet ◽  
Joshua M. Tybur ◽  
Junhui Wu ◽  
Christian Antonellis ◽  
Paul A. M. Van Lange

Theories suggest that political ideology relates to cooperation, with conservatives being more likely to pursue selfish outcomes, and liberals more likely to pursue egalitarian outcomes. In study 1, we examine how political ideology and political party affiliation (Republican vs. Democrat) predict cooperation with a partner who self-identifies as Republican or Democrat in two samples before ( n = 362) and after ( n = 366) the 2012 US presidential election. Liberals show slightly more concern for their partners’ outcomes compared to conservatives (study 1), and in study 2 this relation is supported by a meta-analysis ( r = .15). However, in study 1, political ideology did not relate to cooperation in general. Both Republicans and Democrats extend more cooperation to their in-group relative to the out-group, and this is explained by expectations of cooperation from in-group versus out-group members. We discuss the relation between political ideology and cooperation within and between groups.


2018 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 147470491876417 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph Billingsley ◽  
Debra Lieberman ◽  
Joshua M. Tybur

Why is disgust sensitivity associated with socially conservative political views? Is it because socially conservative ideologies mitigate the risks of infectious disease, whether by promoting out-group avoidance or by reinforcing norms that sustain antipathogenic practices? Or might it be because socially conservative ideologies promote moral standards that advance a long-term, as opposed to a short-term, sexual strategy? Recent attempts to test these two explanations have yielded differing results and conflicting interpretations. Here, we contribute to the literature by examining the relationship between disgust sensitivity and political orientation, political party affiliation, and an often overlooked outcome—actual voter behavior. We focus on voter behavior and affiliation for the 2016 U.S. presidential election to determine whether pathogen or sexual disgust better predicts socially conservative ideology. Although many prominent aspects of Donald Trump’s campaign—particularly his anti-foreign message—align with the pathogen-avoidance model of conservatism, we found that pathogen-related disgust sensitivity exerted no influence on political ideology, political party affiliation, or voter behavior, after controlling for sexual disgust sensitivity. In contrast, sexual disgust sensitivity was associated with increased odds of voting for Donald Trump versus each other major presidential candidate, as well as with increased odds of affiliating with the Republican versus the Democratic or Libertarian parties. In fact, for every unit increase in sexual disgust sensitivity, the odds of a participant voting for Trump versus Clinton increased by approximately 30%. It seems, then, that sexual disgust trumps pathogen disgust in predicting socially conservative voting behavior.


2007 ◽  
Vol 101 (3_suppl) ◽  
pp. 1050-1056 ◽  
Author(s):  
Antonio Laverghetta ◽  
Juliana Stewart ◽  
Lawrence Weinstein

To estimate correlations for scores on a student anti-intellectualism scale with scores on a measure of political conservatism, 235 students were given a survey containing a student anti-intellectualism scale, a political conservatism scale, and a demographics questionnaire identifying the participants' sex, college classification, ethnicity, political party affiliation, and self-described political ideology. The political conservatism scale contained two factors, Religiosity and Economic Conservatism, both of which were scored separately in addition to an overall Conservatism score. Students' Anti-intellectualism scores were correlated with Political Conservatism scores ( r = .37, p<.01), with Religiosity scores ( r = .42, p<.01), and with Economic Conservatism scores ( r = .17, p<.05). An analysis of variance indicated a significant difference in students' Anti-intellectualism scores based on college classification ( F4,233 = 2.27, p<.04). Specifically, freshman had significantly higher scores than graduate students.


2015 ◽  
Vol 40 (03) ◽  
pp. 723-745 ◽  
Author(s):  
Julie E. Artis ◽  
Andrew V. Krebs

Rapid changes in family life over the last forty years have led to substantial alterations in family law policy; specifically, most states now endorse joint custody arrangements for divorcing families. However, we know little about how lower court judges have embraced or resisted this change. We conducted in‐depth interviews with judges in twenty‐five Indiana jurisdictions in 1998 and 2011. Our findings suggest that judges' views of joint custody dramatically changed. Judges in Wave II indicated a strong preference for joint custody—a theme that was relatively absent in Wave I. The observed change in judicial preferences did not seem to be related to judicial replacement, gender, age, or political party affiliation. Although our conclusions are exploratory, we speculate that shifts in judicial views may be related to changing public mores of parenthood and, relatedly, Indiana's adoption of Parenting Time Guidelines in 2001.


2001 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-12 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brian Czech ◽  
Rena Borkhataria

Species conservation via the Endangered Species Act is highly politicized, yet few data have been gathered to illustrate the relationship of political party affiliation to species conservation perspectives. We conducted a nationwide public opinion survey and found that Democrats value species conservation more highly than do Republicans, and that Democrats are also more strongly supportive of the Endangered Species Act. Republicans place higher value on property rights than do Democrats, but members of both parties value economic growth as highly as wildlife conservation. The results imply that the Democratic propensity to value species conservation reflects a biocentric perspective that does not bode well for practical conservation efforts. Species conservation will depend upon the success of academicians and progressive political leaders in educating students and members of all parties about the fundamental conflict between economic growth and wildlife conservation.


2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sindiso Mafico

Does social class affect political party affiliation in the African-American community? Drawing on two contrasting theories: the theory of group interests and class-based theories of stratification put forth by Wilson and Shelton (2006), I propose that African -Americans who report being of a high socio-economic class are more likely to be Republican than African Americans of a lower socio-economic class. Through secondary analysis of data provided by the General Social Survey (GSS), I investigate the relationship between political party affiliation and social class in the African-American community. By combining data across 20 years between 1996 and 2016, the sample size is 1557 African-Americans. Measures of socio-economic status are limited to a single variable that asks respondents about their subjective social class, while the dependent variable was operationalized by a variable that inquires the respondent's political party affiliation. Multiple regression analysis reveals that there is no statistically significant relationship between social class and political party affiliation. There is however, a relationship between political party affiliation and another measure of social class, specifically the respondents' level of education. The strongest predictor of political party affiliation is the age of the respondents which gives insight on future voting patterns in the African-American community. While the hypothesis is not supported, the results shed light on the potential reasons for increased support for the Republican Party among African-Americans and could be used to predict voting outcomes among African-Americans for future elections.


Social Forces ◽  
1968 ◽  
Vol 47 (2) ◽  
pp. 145 ◽  
Author(s):  
D. Stanley Eitzen ◽  
Gary M. Maranell

Author(s):  
Tsolin Nalbantian

Chapter 4 investigates Armenians’ stance in the 1957 elections and in the ‘general’ Lebanese and the intra-Armenian mini-civil war of 1958. Armenian parties participated in, and contributed to, political tensions in Lebanon. Simultaneously, they used their position in the Lebanese political system to jostle for power within their own community – a development that turned violent and ended only in December 1958, almost two months after the Lebanese mini-civil war had ended. This tension and violent confrontation between Armenian parties and their armed men had a crucial spatial effect: it unprecedentedly territorialized certain neighborhoods of Beirut. Whereas parts of Lebanon were organized by sects and classes, by relative contrast, it was according to political party affiliation that in 1957/1958 many Armenians of Mar Mikael, Sin el Fil, Bourj Hamoud, and Corniche el-Nahr were re-sorted and relocated, often by force. Lebanese Armenians aligned along the right-left fault lines that divided Lebanese politics and society— more than other confessions, indeed. Vice versa, the Lebanese state was Armenianized, as it were, in that it started to pay more attention to Armenian matters than before, intervening directly and by military force in Armenian neighborhoods in order to finally end the internecine Armenian confrontation.


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