scholarly journals The spiral of distrust: (Non-)cooperation in a repeated trust game is predicted by anger and individual differences in negative reciprocity orientation

2016 ◽  
Vol 52 ◽  
pp. 18-25 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nicole S. Harth ◽  
Tobias Regner
Keyword(s):  
Individual Differences ◽  
Trust Game ◽  
Negative Reciprocity

scholarly journals Stable distribution of reciprocity motives in a population

2020 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeroen M. van Baar ◽  
Felix H. Klaassen ◽  
Filippo Ricci ◽  
Luke J. Chang ◽  
Alan G. Sanfey
Keyword(s):  
Individual Differences ◽  
Stable Distribution ◽  
Subjective Experience ◽  
Social Preference ◽  
Game Studies ◽  
Trust Game ◽  
Social Motives ◽  
Psychological Mechanisms ◽  
Modeling Analysis ◽  
Relative Prevalence

Abstract Evolutionary models show that human cooperation can arise through direct reciprocity relationships. However, it remains unclear which psychological mechanisms proximally motivate individuals to reciprocate. Recent evidence suggests that the psychological motives for choosing to reciprocate trust differ between individuals, which raises the question whether these differences have a stable distribution in a population or are rather an artifact of the experimental task. Here, we combine data from three independent trust game studies to find that the relative prevalence of different reciprocity motives is highly stable across participant samples. Furthermore, the distribution of motives is relatively unaffected by changes to the salient features of the experimental paradigm. Finally, the motive classification assigned by our computational modeling analysis corresponds to the participants’ own subjective experience of their psychological decision process, and no existing models of social preference can account for the observed individual differences in reciprocity motives. These findings support the view that reciprocal decision-making is not just regulated by individual differences in 'pro-social’ versus ‘pro-self’ tendencies, but also by trait-like differences across several alternative pro-social motives, whose distribution in a population is stable.

Who Takes the most Revenge? Individual Differences in Negative Reciprocity Norm Endorsement

2004 ◽  
Vol 30 (6) ◽  
pp. 787-799 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Eisenberger ◽  
Patrick Lynch ◽  
Justin Aselage ◽  
Stephanie Rohdieck
Keyword(s):  
Individual Differences ◽  
Negative Reciprocity

scholarly journals Multi-Round Trust Game Quantifies Inter-Individual Differences in Social Exchange from Adolescence to Adulthood

2021 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 102-118
Author(s):  
Andreas Hula ◽  
Michael Moutoussis ◽  
Geert-Jan Will ◽  
Danae Kokorikou ◽  
Andrea M. Reiter ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Individual Differences ◽  
Social Exchange ◽  
Trust Game

scholarly journals The personal norm of reciprocity

2003 ◽  
Vol 17 (4) ◽  
pp. 251-283 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marco Perugini ◽  
Marcello Gallucci ◽  
Fabio Presaghi ◽  
Anna Paola Ercolani
Keyword(s):  
Individual Differences ◽  
Psychometric Properties ◽  
Cultural Study ◽  
Social Norm ◽  
Cross Cultural ◽  
Two Cultures ◽  
Cross Cultural Study ◽  
Negative Reciprocity ◽  
Personal Norm ◽  
Norm Of Reciprocity

Reciprocity is here considered as an internalized social norm, and a questionnaire to measure individual differences in the internalized norm of reciprocity is presented. The questionnaire, Personal Norm of Reciprocity (PNR), measures three aspects of reciprocity: positive reciprocity, negative reciprocity, and beliefs in reciprocity. The PNR has been developed and tested in two cultures, British and Italian, for a total of 951 participants. A cross‐cultural study provides evidence of good psychometric properties and generalizability of the PNR. Data provide evidence for criterion validity and show that positive and negative reciprocators behave in different ways as a function of the valence (positive or negative) of the other's past behaviour, the type of feasible reaction (reward versus punishment), and the fairness of their reaction. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Personality influences on ultimatum bargaining decisions

2001 ◽  
Vol 15 (1_suppl) ◽  
pp. S53-S70 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hermann Brandstätter ◽  
Manfred Königstein
Keyword(s):  
Individual Differences ◽  
Social Norm ◽  
Ultimatum Game ◽  
Bargaining Game ◽  
Economic Rationality ◽  
Cost Share ◽  
Personality Dimensions ◽  
Negative Reciprocity ◽  
The Social ◽  
Advance Production

We investigate individual differences in behaviour within an ultimatum game with advance production. It is a simple bargaining game, in which the size of the ‘pie’ to be distributed between two parties depends on both players' monetary investments. One player, the ‘proposer’, has to state a demand, which can be accepted as it is or rejected (with the consequence of zero return for both players) by the second player (‘responder’). We find that global personality measures contribute significantly to the explanation of both demands and rejection decisions. Proposers who score high on independence and tough‐mindedness, two global personality dimensions with affinity to selfishness, demand higher return shares than proposers who score low on these dimensions. This is particularly true when the proposer's cost share is low, i.e. when a high demanded return share cannot be justified by a concern for equity. In this situation there is a strong conflict between economic rationality and equity. Regarding rejection decisions we find that reciprocity oriented responders (i.e. persons who are either emotionally unstable and extraverted or emotionally stable and introverted) reject a proposal more often than others. Rejection of an unsatisfying offer is interpreted as an act of angry retaliation (negative reciprocity) against an interaction partner who violates the social norm of equity. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

scholarly journals How (un-)informative are experiments with “standard subjects” for other social groups? – The case of agricultural students and farmers

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sven Gruener ◽  
Mira Lehberger ◽  
Norbert Hirschauer ◽  
Oliver Mußhoff
Keyword(s):  
Risk Aversion ◽  
Social Groups ◽  
Gift Exchange ◽  
Trust Game ◽  
Monetary Incentives ◽  
Negative Reciprocity ◽  
Ultimatum Bargaining Game ◽  
Experimental Subjects ◽  
Agricultural Students ◽  
Positive Reciprocity

This paper analyzes whether there is a gap between agricultural students’ and non-students’ (farmers’) behaviors in economic experiments which are often used to measure risk aversion, impatience, positive reciprocity, negative reciprocity, altruism, and trust. A further question is whether monetary incentives matter in this respect. We use the Holt and Laury procedure (2002) to elicit risk aversion, the procedure according to Laury et al. (2012) to measure impatience, a gift exchange game (Charness et al. 2004) to capture positive reciprocity, an ultimatum bargaining game (Güth et al. 1982) to assess negative reciprocity, a dictator experiment (Engel 2011) to gauge altruism, and a trust game (Kosfeld et al. 2005) to assess trust in others. We find no differences between agricultural students and farmers in their risk aversion, whereas the latter are fund to be considerably more impatient than the former. Positive and negative reciprocity is slightly more pronounced with farmers. Findings regarding altruism in the two groups are mixed and trust is somewhat more pronounced with farmers. The paper challenges approaches that assume that students can be used as standard experimental subjects whose behaviors can be generalized towards other populations.

scholarly journals Trust Toward Robots and Artificial Intelligence: An Experimental Approach to Human–Technology Interactions Online

2020 ◽  
Vol 11 ◽  
Author(s):  
Atte Oksanen ◽  
Nina Savela ◽  
Rita Latikka ◽  
Aki Koivula
Keyword(s):  
Artificial Intelligence ◽  
United States ◽  
Individual Differences ◽  
Big Five ◽  
Experimental Approach ◽  
The United States ◽  
Personality Characteristics ◽  
Trust Game ◽  
Control Group ◽  
Big Five Personality

Robotization and artificial intelligence (AI) are expected to change societies profoundly. Trust is an important factor of human–technology interactions, as robots and AI increasingly contribute to tasks previously handled by humans. Currently, there is a need for studies investigating trust toward AI and robots, especially in first-encounter meetings. This article reports findings from a study investigating trust toward robots and AI in an online trust game experiment. The trust game manipulated the hypothetical opponents that were described as either AI or robots. These were compared with control group opponents using only a human name or a nickname. Participants (N = 1077) lived in the United States. Describing opponents with robots or AI did not impact participants’ trust toward them. The robot called jdrx894 was the most trusted opponent. Opponents named “jdrx894” were trusted more than opponents called “Michael.” Further analysis showed that having a degree in technology or engineering, exposure to robots online and robot use self-efficacy predicted higher trust toward robots and AI. Out of Big Five personality characteristics, openness to experience predicted higher trust, and conscientiousness predicted lower trust. Results suggest trust on robots and AI is contextual and it is also dependent on individual differences and knowledge on technology.

The challenge of accounting for individual differences in folk-economic beliefs

2018 ◽  
Vol 41 ◽  
Author(s):  
Benjamin C. Ruisch ◽  
Rajen A. Anderson ◽  
David A. Pizarro
Keyword(s):  
Individual Differences ◽  
Individual Variation ◽  
Political Ideologies ◽  
Economic Beliefs ◽  
Existing Data

AbstractWe argue that existing data on folk-economic beliefs (FEBs) present challenges to Boyer & Petersen's model. Specifically, the widespread individual variation in endorsement of FEBs casts doubt on the claim that humans are evolutionarily predisposed towards particular economic beliefs. Additionally, the authors' model cannot account for the systematic covariance between certain FEBs, such as those observed in distinct political ideologies.

Individual differences, social attention, and the history of the social motivation hypotheses of autism

2019 ◽  
Vol 42 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter C. Mundy
Keyword(s):  
Individual Differences ◽  
Early Development ◽  
Emotional Development ◽  
Social Motivation ◽  
Social Attention ◽  
Social Emotional Development ◽  
Social Emotional ◽  
Precise Understanding ◽  
The Social ◽  
History Of

Abstract The stereotype of people with autism as unresponsive or uninterested in other people was prominent in the 1980s. However, this view of autism has steadily given way to recognition of important individual differences in the social-emotional development of affected people and a more precise understanding of the possible role social motivation has in their early development.

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