scholarly journals A bargaining model for PLS entrepreneurial financing: A game theoretic model using agent‐based simulation

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adil El Fakir ◽  
Richard Fairchild ◽  
Mohamed Tkiouat ◽  
Abderrahim Taamouti
Keyword(s):  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Bargaining Model ◽  
Agent Based Simulation ◽  
Agent Based ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model ◽  
Entrepreneurial Financing

Agent-based game-theoretic model for collaborative web services: Decision making analysis

2013 ◽  
Vol 40 (8) ◽  
pp. 3207-3219 ◽  
Author(s):  
Babak Khosravifar ◽  
Jamal Bentahar ◽  
Rabeb Mizouni ◽  
Hadi Otrok ◽  
Mahsa Alishahi ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Web Services ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Agent Based ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model

scholarly journals On Rational Delegations in Liquid Democracy

2019 ◽  
Vol 33 ◽  
pp. 1796-1803 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daan Bloembergen ◽  
Davide Grossi ◽  
Martin Lackner
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibria ◽  
Pure Strategy ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Agent Based ◽  
Proxy Voting ◽  
Liquid Democracy ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model ◽  
Theoretical Results ◽  
Voting Method

Liquid democracy is a proxy voting method where proxies are delegable. We propose and study a game-theoretic model of liquid democracy to address the following question: when is it rational for a voter to delegate her vote? We study the existence of pure-strategy Nash equilibria in this model, and how group accuracy is affected by them. We complement these theoretical results by means of agent-based simulations to study the effects of delegations on group’s accuracy on variously structured social networks.

Modeling human factors influencing herding during evacuation

2017 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 211-234 ◽  
Author(s):  
Muzna Zafar ◽  
Kashif Zia ◽  
Dinesh Kumar Saini ◽  
Arshad Muhammad ◽  
Alois Ferscha
Keyword(s):  
Optimal Path ◽  
Trust Model ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Evacuation Time ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Agent Based ◽  
Proposed Model ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Crowd Evacuation ◽  
Game Theoretic Model

Purpose It has been witnessed that many incidents of crowd evacuation have resulted in catastrophic results, claiming lives of hundreds of people. Most of these incidents were a result of localized herding that eventually turned into global panic. Many crowd evacuation models have been proposed with different aspects of interests. The purpose of this paper is to attempt to bring together many of these aspects to study evacuation dynamics. Design/methodology/approach The proposed agent-based model, in a hypothetical physical environment, uses perception maps for routing decisions which are constructed from agents’ personal observations of the surroundings as well as information gathered through distant communication. Communication is governed by a trust model which measures the authenticity of the information being shared. Agents are of two types; emotional and rational. The trust model is combined with a game-theoretic model to resolve conflict of agents’ own type with that of types of agents in the neighborhood. Findings Evacuation dynamics in different environmental and exit strategies are evaluated on the basis of reduced herding and evacuation time. Using this integrated information sharing model, agents gain an overall view of the environment, sufficient to select the optimal path towards exits with respect to reduced herding and evacuation time. Originality/value The proposed model has been formulated and established using an agent-based simulation integrating important modeling aspects. The paper helps in understanding the interplay between technological and humanistic aspects in smart and pervasive environments.

scholarly journals Partner choice creates fairness in humans

2015 ◽  
Vol 282 (1808) ◽  
pp. 20150392 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stéphane Debove ◽  
Jean-Baptiste André ◽  
Nicolas Baumard
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionary History ◽  
Partner Choice ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Agent Based ◽  
Outside Options ◽  
Behavioural Experiment ◽  
Agent Based Simulations ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model

Many studies demonstrate that partner choice has played an important role in the evolution of human cooperation, but little work has tested its impact on the evolution of human fairness. In experiments involving divisions of money, people become either over-generous or over-selfish when they are in competition to be chosen as cooperative partners. Hence, it is difficult to see how partner choice could result in the evolution of fair, equal divisions. Here, we show that this puzzle can be solved if we consider the outside options on which partner choice operates. We conduct a behavioural experiment, run agent-based simulations and analyse a game-theoretic model to understand how outside options affect partner choice and fairness. All support the conclusion that partner choice leads to fairness only when individuals have equal outside options. We discuss how this condition has been met in our evolutionary history, and the implications of these findings for our understanding of other aspects of fairness less specific than preferences for equal divisions of resources.

Stability in the informal value transfer systems: norms of trust or institutions of control?

2017 ◽  
pp. 120-130
Author(s):  
A. Lyasko
Keyword(s):  
Social Control ◽  
Institutional Economics ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Transfer System ◽  
Value Transfer ◽  
Partner Interaction ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model ◽  
Informal Value Transfer System

Informal financial operations exist in the shadow of official regulation and cannot be protected by the formal legal instruments, therefore raising concerns about the enforcement of obligations taken by their participants. This paper analyzes two alternative types of auxiliary institutions, which can coordinate expectations of the members of informal value transfer systems, namely attitudes of trust and norms of social control. It offers some preliminary approaches to creating a game-theoretic model of partner interaction in the informal value transfer system. It also sheds light on the perspectives of further studies in this area of institutional economics.

Hollywood’s Movie Production Companies in Game Theoretic Model

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nargiz Mammadova ◽  
Aygun Malikova ◽  
Arzu Heydarova
Keyword(s):  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model

Augmenting Employees’ Efforts in Innovation

2021 ◽  
pp. 097674792198917
Author(s):  
Nikita Jain
Keyword(s):  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Wrongful Discharge ◽  
Equilibrium Level ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model ◽  
The Impact

Strong labour laws play a major role in motivating innovation among employees. It has been found in the literature that stringency of labour laws is positively linked with employees’ efforts in innovation, in particular, wrongful discharge laws (WDL). However, employees may also bring nuisance suits against employers. Usually, the result of these suits is that both parties settle with each other. Thus, even if employees are justly dismissed, they may be able to bring nuisance suits against employers and gain a settlement amount. This article investigates how the possibility of nuisance suits affects the impact of WDL on employees’ efforts in innovation. In this respect, a game-theoretic model is developed in the article to find the equilibrium level of employees’ efforts in the presence of nuisance suits, where there is a possibility of employees getting discharged from the firm. I find that if nuisance suits are a possibility, the stringency of WDL has no impact on employees’ efforts if defence cost of the firm is low; but for higher defence costs, WDL affects employees’ efforts. The efforts exerted by an employee are found to be weakly increasing in the defence costs of the firm.

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