Yield curve data choice and potential moral hazard: An empirical exercise on pricing callable bonds

Author(s):  
Antonio Díaz ◽  
Francisco Jareño ◽  
Eliseo Navarro
ALQALAM ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 33 (1) ◽  
pp. 46
Author(s):  
Aswadi Lubis

The purpose of writing this article is to describe the agency problems that arise in the application of the financing with mudharabah on Islamic banking. In this article the author describes the use of the theory of financing, asymetri information, agency problems inside of financing. The conclusion of this article is that the financing is asymmetric information problems will arise, both adverse selection and moral hazard. The high risk of prospective managers (mudharib) for their moral hazard and lack of readiness of human resources in Islamic banking is among the factors that make the composition of the distribution of funds to the public more in the form of financing. The limitations that can be done to optimize this financing is among other things; owners of capital supervision (monitoring) and the customers themselves place restrictions on its actions (bonding).


ALQALAM ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 31 (1) ◽  
pp. 187
Author(s):  
Budi Harsanto

The fall of Enron, Lehman Brothers and other major financial institution in the world make researchers conduct various studies about crisis. The research question in this study is, from Islamic economics and business standpoint, why the global financial crisis can happen repeatedly. The purpose is to contribute ideas regarding Islamic viewpoint linked with the global financial crisis. The methodology used is a theoretical-reflective to various article published in academic journals and other intellectual resources with relevant themes. There are lots of analyses on the causes of the crisis. For discussion purposes, the causes divide into two big parts namely ethics and systemic. Ethics contributed to the crisis by greed and moral hazard as a theme that almost always arises in the study of the global financial crisis. Systemic means that the crisis can only be overcome with a major restructuring of the system. Islamic perspective on these two aspect is diametrically different. At ethics side, there is exist direction to obtain blessing in economics and business activities. At systemic side, there is rule of halal and haram and a set of mechanism of economics system such as the concept of ownership that will early prevent the seeds of crisis. Keywords: Islamic economics and business, business ethics, financial crisis 


CFA Magazine ◽  
2012 ◽  
Vol 23 (5) ◽  
pp. 20-21
Author(s):  
Osman Ghani
Keyword(s):  

1979 ◽  
Vol 35 (3) ◽  
pp. 31-39 ◽  
Author(s):  
Herbert F. Ayres ◽  
John Y. Barry

1993 ◽  
Vol 49 (2) ◽  
pp. 78-82
Author(s):  
Alan J. Daskin ◽  
Vivek Kulkarni
Keyword(s):  

2020 ◽  
Vol 26 (12) ◽  
pp. 2858-2878
Author(s):  
M.I. Emets

Subject. The article addresses the green bond pricing as compared to bonds other than green ones. Objectives. The aims are to determine how the fact that a bond is identified as a green one, the issue amount, and the availability of third-party verification, influence the yield to maturity; to make recommendations on effective green bond pricing. Methods. The study employs econometric testing of hypotheses, using the multiple linear regression. The sample includes 318 green and 1695 conventional bonds. Results. Green bonds have a lower yield to maturity in comparison with conventional bonds. The yield to maturity of green bonds with third-party verification is lower, as contrasted with green bonds without verification. Conclusions. The next step in the green bond market development is creating a benchmark yield curve for sovereign green bonds, with parallel issuance of conventional, non-green bonds. The yield curve is crucial for effective bond pricing. Two yield curves, i.e. for green and non-green bonds, will enable investors to estimate the fair price on issuance, as well as to define, if there is a difference in pricing.


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