Studying the relationship between managerial ability and real earnings management in economic and financial crisis conditions

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zahra H. Oskouei ◽  
Zahra Heidary Sureshjani
Keyword(s):  
Financial Crisis ◽  
Earnings Management ◽  
Real Earnings Management ◽  
Managerial Ability ◽  
Crisis Conditions ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Economic And Financial Crisis

The relationship between managerial ability, earnings management and internal control quality on audit fees in Iran

2019 ◽  
Vol 69 (4) ◽  
pp. 685-703 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mahdi Salehi ◽  
Mahmoud Mousavi Shiri ◽  
Seyedeh Zahra Hossini
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Internal Control ◽  
Significant Relationship ◽  
Stock Exchange ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Real Earnings Management ◽  
Managerial Ability ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Control Quality ◽  
The Relationship

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to emphasize the relationship between managerial ability, earnings management, internal control quality and audit fees to establish whether or not there is a significant relationship between the variables of managerial ability, earnings management, internal control quality and the audit fees. Design/methodology/approach The study sample includes 190 listed companies on the Tehran Stock Exchange during 2009–2016. Research hypotheses were tested using the statistical methods of multivariable linear regression and data envelopment analysis pattern. Findings The obtained results indicate that there is a significant and direct relationship between managerial ability and internal control quality as well as real earnings management and internal control quality. Based on the results obtained from the second hypothesis, the authors could claim that there is an inverse and significant relationship managerial ability and audit fees. The third hypothesis also revealed that in companies with lower audit fees, there is a stronger relationship between managerial ability and internal control quality. The results of related tests show no significant relationship between accrual-based earnings management and internal control quality. Originality/value This paper is the first study in Iran whose main focus is on the relationship between managerial ability, earnings management, internal control quality and audit fees.

scholarly journals Unconditional Accounting Conservatism and Real Earnings Management

2018 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 203 ◽  
Author(s):  
Han Li
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Internal Control ◽  
Negative Relationship ◽  
Robustness Analysis ◽  
Accounting Conservatism ◽  
Real Earnings Management ◽  
Audit Risk ◽  
Operation Costs ◽  
Abnormal Operation ◽  
The Relationship

This research examines the relationship between unconditional accounting conservatism and real earnings management in China’s corporations. Using the regression models, the real earnings management proxies are found by the abnormal cash flow of operations, the abnormal operation costs and the abnormal discretionary expenses and the aggregated measures. The research sheds light on the negative relationship between unconditional accounting conservatism and real earnings management after controlling internal control quality and audit risk. The results of these inferences remain the same after dealing with the robustness analysis and the endogeneity concerns.

scholarly journals The impact of ownership type on the relationship between corporate governance and earnings management: An empirical study

2019 ◽  
Vol 16 (4) ◽  
pp. 31-44
Author(s):  
Ahmed Boghdady
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Earnings Management ◽  
Cash Flows ◽  
Real Earnings Management ◽  
Ownership Type ◽  
Moderation Effect ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms ◽  
The Impact ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Privately Owned

This study investigates the effect of ownership type on the relation between corporate governance and earnings management. While previous literature has mainly examined the relationship between corporate governance and both accrual and real earnings management, no study to date, to the researcher’s best knowledge, focused on the moderation effect of ownership type on this relationship. Three proxies for measuring accrual and real earnings management, namely discretionary accruals (DA), abnormal cash flows (ACFO), and abnormal discretionary expenses (ADISX) are employed. Three empirical models (i.e. DA, ACFO, and ADISX) are developed in which the earnings management proxies represent the dependent variables and are tested using a sample of non-financial companies containing state-owned and privately owned companies over the period from 2010 to 2017, with 1030 firm-year observations. The results show a positive relationship between ownership type and both accruals manipulation and sales manipulation. In general, the results suggest that the ownership type moderates the relationship between corporate governance and earnings management. The results suggest also that corporate governance mechanisms may not play an almost the same role in monitoring and mitigating real earnings management (REM) practices as they do for accrual earnings management (AEM) in Egypt. Moreover, no evidence is found supportive of the trade-off effect which means that managers in Egyptian firms use both types of earnings management jointly to reach the target levels of earnings

How does real earnings management respond to the 2007-2008 financial crisis?

2020 ◽  
Vol 32 (4) ◽  
pp. 495-517
Author(s):  
Zhigang Li ◽  
Yuan-Teng Hsu ◽  
Xiang Gao
Keyword(s):  
Financial Crisis ◽  
Earnings Management ◽  
Global Financial Crisis ◽  
Probit Model ◽  
Real Earnings Management ◽  
Share Repurchases ◽  
2008 Financial Crisis ◽  
Event Window ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Dummy Variable

Purpose This paper aims to investigate the dynamics of repurchase-based earnings management vis-à-vis other real activities manipulations during the 2007–2008 financial crisis. Design/methodology/approach This paper adopts a Probit model to regress alternate real earnings management (REM) methods on a dummy variable indicating whether a firm falls in the crisis event window or not, during our 15-year sample period. This paper also detects switches made by suspected firms from repurchasing to other REM tools such as reducing discretionary expenditures. Findings This paper provides solid evidence indicating that firms suspected of earnings management have the tendency to decrease accretive share repurchases after the onset of the crisis. Conversely, the above pattern is neither observed in non-suspect firms nor over non-crisis periods. A further investigation documents that firms that switch REM during crisis can be characterized by less cash holding, smaller size, more severe liquidity shortage and/or tighter financial constraint. Originality/value This paper contributes to the literature on understanding the respective and interactive implications of both share repurchases and global financial crisis on firms’ REM activities.

The effects of global financial crisis on the relationship between CEO compensation and earnings management

2020 ◽  
Vol 28 (2) ◽  
pp. 389-408 ◽  
Author(s):  
Oheneba Assenso-Okofo ◽  
Muhammad Jahangir Ali ◽  
Kamran Ahmed
Keyword(s):  
Financial Crisis ◽  
Earnings Management ◽  
Chief Executive Officers ◽  
Ceo Compensation ◽  
Global Financial Crisis ◽  
Chief Executive ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Multivariate Tests ◽  
Executive Officers ◽  
The Relationship

Purpose This paper aims to examine the effects of global financial crisis (GFC) on chief executive officers’ (CEO) compensation and earnings management relationship. Specifically, the authors examine whether the recent financial crisis had moderated the relationship between CEO bonus and discretionary accruals. Design/methodology/approach The authors use panel data for 1,800 firm-year observations (over a period of six years from 2005 to 2010) and use univariate and multivariate tests to test their hypothesis. The authors divide the period into pre-crisis, during-crisis and post-crisis periods to examine how the different financial crisis periods affect the relationship between CEO compensation and earnings management. Various alternative tests including endogeneity test suggest that the results are robust. Findings The authors’ multivariate results indicate that the relationship between CEO’ compensation and earnings management changes because of the GFC. Practical implications The findings, therefore, justify more monitoring and scrutiny to limit the existence of opportunistic managerial behaviour and for the appropriate designing of CEO compensation packages during abnormal economic circumstances. Originality/value So far as the authors’ knowledge goes, this is the first study which examines the relationship between CEO compensation and earnings management during GFC.

The Relationship between Aggressive Real Earnings Management and Current and Future Audit Fees

2016 ◽  
Vol 36 (1) ◽  
pp. 85-107 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adam Greiner ◽  
Mark J. Kohlbeck ◽  
Thomas J. Smith
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Firm Value ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Cash Flows ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Real Earnings Management ◽  
Increased Risk ◽  
Pricing Behavior ◽  
Reported Earnings ◽  
The Relationship

SUMMARY We examine the relationship between aggressive income-increasing real earnings management (REM) and current and future audit fees. Managers pursue REM activities to influence reported earnings and, as a consequence, alter cash flows and sacrifice firm value. We posit that the implications of REM are considered in auditors' assessments of engagement risk related to the client's economic condition and result in higher audit fees. We find that, with the exception of abnormal reductions in SG&A, aggressive income-increasing REM is positively associated with both current and future audit fees. Additional analyses provide evidence consistent with increased effort combined with increased risk contributing to the current pricing effect, with increased business risk primarily driving the future pricing effect. We, therefore, provide evidence that aggressive income-increasing REM activities have a significant influence on auditor pricing behavior, consistent with the audit framework associating engagement risk with audit fees. JEL Classifications: G21; G34; M41. Data Availability: The data in this study are available from public sources indicated in the paper.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document