Executive control and higher-order theory of mind in children at risk of ADHD

2002 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 141-158 ◽  
Author(s):  
Josef Perner ◽  
Winfried Kain ◽  
Petra Barchfeld
Keyword(s):  
At Risk ◽  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Executive Control ◽  
Order Theory ◽  
Higher Order ◽  
Children At Risk ◽  
Higher Order Theory

scholarly journals Estimating the Use of Higher-Order Theory of Mind Using Computational Agents

2018 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Harmen de Weerd ◽  
Denny Diepgrond ◽  
Rineke Verbrugge
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Bayesian Model ◽  
Mental Content ◽  
Order Theory ◽  
Higher Order ◽  
Competitive Game ◽  
Matching Pennies ◽  
Reactive Strategy ◽  
Higher Order Theory ◽  
Recursive Thinking

Abstract When people make decisions in a social context, they often make use of theory of mind, by reasoning about unobservable mental content of others. For example, the behavior of a pedestrian who wants to cross the street depends on whether or not he believes that the driver of an oncoming car has seen him or not. People can also reason about the theory of mind abilities of others, leading to recursive thinking of the sort ‘I think that you think that I think…’. Previous research suggests that this ability may be especially effective in simple competitive settings. In this paper, we use a combination of computational agents and Bayesian model selection to determine to what extent people make use of higher-order theory of mind reasoning in a particular competitive game known as matching pennies. We find that while many children and adults appear to make use of theory of mind, participants are also often classified as using a simpler reactive strategy based only on the actions of the directly preceding round. This may indicate that human reasoners do not primarily use their theory of mind abilities to compete with others.

scholarly journals Understandable robots - What, Why, and How

2018 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 110-123 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas Hellström ◽  
Suna Bensch
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Order Theory ◽  
Higher Order ◽  
Proposed Model ◽  
Higher Order Theory ◽  
Communicative Actions ◽  
The Mind ◽  
Novel Model

Abstract As robots become more and more capable and autonomous, there is an increasing need for humans to understand what the robots do and think. In this paper, we investigate what such understanding means and includes, and how robots can be designed to support understanding. After an in-depth survey of related earlier work, we discuss examples showing that understanding includes not only the intentions of the robot, but also desires, knowledge, beliefs, emotions, perceptions, capabilities, and limitations of the robot. The term understanding is formally defined, and the term communicative actions is defined to denote the various ways in which a robot may support a human’s understanding of the robot. A novel model of interaction for understanding is presented. The model describes how both human and robot may utilize a first or higher-order theory of mind to understand each other and perform communicative actions in order to support the other’s understanding. It also describes simpler cases in which the robot performs static communicative actions in order to support the human’s understanding of the robot. In general, communicative actions performed by the robot aim at reducing the mismatch between the mind of the robot, and the robot’s inferred model of the human’s model of the mind of the robot. Based on the proposed model, a set of questions are formulated, to serve as support when developing and implementing the model in real interacting robots.

Theory of Mind Performance in Middle Childhood: Australian Normative and Validation Data

2009 ◽  
Vol 26 (2) ◽  
pp. 138-153
Author(s):  
Larry Cashion
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Middle Childhood ◽  
The United States ◽  
Order Theory ◽  
Autism Spectrum ◽  
Higher Order ◽  
Validation Data ◽  
Cultural Aspects ◽  
Higher Order Theory ◽  
Reported Data

AbstractTheory of mind tests are regularly used in childhood research and clinical practice for autism spectrum disorders in Australia. Despite this, there is little empirical evidence that the tests used in the United Kingdom and the United States have validity for Australian children. Furthermore, many tests believed to assess ‘advanced’ or ‘higher-order’ theory of mind have not had their reliability or validity rigorously evaluated. In the current study, seven theory of mind tasks were administered to 216 Australian children aged 6 to 12 years as part of a larger research project. While Australian children performed similarly to previous research samples on some tasks, there were marked discrepancies on others. Despite these differences, the validity of using a three-factor structure of first-, second-, and higher-order theory of mind tasks was supported by subsequent confirmatory factor analysis. Methodological issues accounted for some differences between the Australian and previously reported data. However, there were also some cross-cultural aspects of the results that require further investigation.

Higher-order theory of mind in the Tacit Communication Game

2015 ◽  
Vol 11 ◽  
pp. 10-21 ◽  
Author(s):  
Harmen de Weerd ◽  
Rineke Verbrugge ◽  
Bart Verheij
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Order Theory ◽  
Higher Order ◽  
Higher Order Theory

scholarly journals Consciência intencional e autoconsciência. As teses de Brentano perante as teorias de ordem superior

2021 ◽  
pp. 391
Author(s):  
Pedro M.S. Alves
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Mental State ◽  
Conscious Experience ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Order Theory ◽  
Higher Order ◽  
Related Question ◽  
Mental Life ◽  
Higher Order Theory

En este artículo, examino algunas características importantes de las teorías de conciencia y autoconciencia de Brentano y Rosenthal. En particular, analizo la distinción entre estados mentales y estados conscientes, y la cuestión relacionada con de determinar si todos los estados mentales pueden convertirse en estados conscientes. Interpreto la teoría de Brentano como una teoría de la mente de un nivel que está de acuerdo con la fusión cartesiana entre los estados mentales y la conciencia. Argumento que los problemas que surgen de la posición de Brentano son, hasta cierto punto, superados por una teoría de orden superior, de modo que la posición de Rosenthal es más precisa. Sin embargo, estoy en desacuerdo con ambos en la interpretación de la consciencia de un estado mental como autoconciencia. Desarrollo los fundamentos de una teoría basada en la primacía del organismo y su mundo vital, y de la experiencia consciente como la forma superior de la vida mental, que tiene, sin embargo, sus raíces en la compleja red de estados mentales que son no estados conscientes.In this paper, I examine some important features of Brentano’s and Rosenthal’s theories of consciousness and self-consciousness. In particular, I discuss the distinction between mental states and conscious states, and the related question of determining whether all mental states can become conscious states. I interpret Brentano’s theory as a one-level theory of mind which is in keeping with the Cartesian conflation between mental states and conscious-ness. I argue that the problems arising from Brentano’s position are to a certain extent surpassed by a higher-order theory, so that Rosenthal’s position is more accurate. Nevertheless, I disagree with both in the construal of the consciousness of a mental state as self-consciousness. I develop then the fundamentals for a theory based on the primacy of the organism and its vital world, and of conscious experience as the higher form of mental life, which has, however, its roots in the complex net of mental states which are not conscious states.

Consciousness, Metacognition, & Perceptual Reality Monitoring

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hakwan Lau
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Justification ◽  
Order Theory ◽  
Higher Order ◽  
Belief Formation ◽  
Reality Monitoring ◽  
Conscious Perception ◽  
Brute Fact ◽  
Higher Order Theory ◽  
Subjective Level

I introduce an empirically-grounded version of a higher-order theory of conscious perception. Traditionally, theories of consciousness either focus on the global availability of conscious information, or take conscious phenomenology as a brute fact due to some biological or basic representational properties. Here I argue instead that the key to characterizing the consciousness lies in its connections to belief formation and epistemic justification on a subjective level.

Dual Aspect Theory

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. Christopher Maloney
Keyword(s):  
Phenomenal Character ◽  
Order Theory ◽  
Higher Order ◽  
Normal Variation ◽  
Perceptual Representations ◽  
Order Representation ◽  
Management Conflicts ◽  
Higher Order Theory

Carruthers proposes a subtle dispositionalist rendition of higher order theory regarding phenomenal character. The theory would distinguish unconscious movement management from conscious attitude management as perceptual processes. Each process takes perceptual representations as inputs. A representation subject to attitude management is apt to induce a higher order representation of itself that secures a self-referential aspect of its content supposedly determinative of phenomenal character. Unfortunately, the account requires a problematic cognitive ambiguity while failing to explain why attitude, but not movement, management, determines character. Moreover, normal variation in attitudinal management conflicts with the constancy typical of phenomenal character. And although an agent denied perceptual access to a scene about which she is otherwise well informed would suffer no phenomenal character, dispositionalist theory entails otherwise. Such problems, together with the results of the previous chapters, suggest that, whether cloaked under intentionalism or higher order theory, representationalism mistakes content for character.

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