Young children embody the time of others in their time judgments: The role of the theory of mind

2018 ◽  
Vol 27 (6) ◽  
pp. e2101 ◽  
Author(s):  
Quentin Hallez ◽  
Sylvie Droit-Volet
1992 ◽  
Vol 4 (3) ◽  
pp. 375-383 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wendy Phillips ◽  
Simon Baron-Cohen ◽  
Michael Rutter

AbstractOne reason for looking at a person's eyes may be to diagnose their goal, because a person's eye direction reliably specifies what they are likely to act upon next. We report an experiment that investigates whether or not young normal infants use eye contact for this function. We placed them in situations in which the adult's action toward them was either ambiguous or unambiguous in its goal. Results showed that the majority of normal infants and young children with mental handicap made instant eye contact immediately following the ambiguous action but rarely after the unambiguous action. Young children with autism, in contrast, made eye contact equally (little) in both conditions. These results are discussed in relation to the function of eye contact, to our understanding of infant cognition, and to the theory of mind hypothesis of autism.


2014 ◽  
Vol 37 (5) ◽  
pp. 482-482 ◽  
Author(s):  
Karen Bartsch ◽  
David Estes

AbstractCimpian & Salomon's (C&S's) characterization of a domain-general inherence heuristic, available to young children, underplays the importance of our early interest in and recognition of agency, intentionality, and mental life. A consideration of the centrality of desires, goals, and agency in our earliest reasoning suggests an alternative, perhaps complementary, account of our tendency to be satisfied with the status quo.


2019 ◽  
Vol 23 (3) ◽  
pp. 342-364 ◽  
Author(s):  
Drew P. Cingel ◽  
Sindy R. Sumter ◽  
Elsemiek Stoeten ◽  
Supreet Mann

2002 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sheryl L. Olson ◽  
Arnold J. Sameroff ◽  
David C. Kerr ◽  
Nestor L. Lopez

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