Pay for beauty? A contingent perspective of CEO facial attractiveness on CEO compensation

2020 ◽  
Vol 60 (6) ◽  
pp. 843-862
Author(s):  
Mingxiang Li ◽  
María del Carmen Triana ◽  
Seo‐Young Byun ◽  
Olga Chapa
2002 ◽  
Vol 61 (1) ◽  
pp. 15-20 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pascal Pansu ◽  
Michel Dubois

The aim of this study was to determine how facial attractiveness of applicants influences pre-selective evaluation in two different occupational fields (one relational and one non-relational). A total of 224 participants (working individuals and students) were asked to judge a fictitious applicant based on a resumé (applicant’s qualifications: highly vs. less qualified) and a photograph (attractive vs. unattractive). Overall, the results showed that facial-attractiveness effects on interpersonal judgments are not absolute, and that their occurrence partly depends on the situation in which the judgments are made. Regardless of occupational field, when the applicants were highly qualified (whether attractive or unattractive) they were systematically judged positively, whereas in the case of less qualified applicants, facial attractiveness differentially affected judgments in the two occupational fields: less-qualified but attractive applicants were only judged more favorably than less-qualified and unattractive ones when the job involved relational skills.


GIS Business ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 11 (5) ◽  
pp. 01-13
Author(s):  
Simon Yang

This paper examines the relative sensitivity of CEO compensation of both acquiring and acquired firms in the top 30 U.S. largest corporate acquisitions in each year for the period of 2003 to 2012. We find that total compensation and bonus granted to executive compensation for acquired companies, not acquiring companies, are significantly related to the amount of acquisition deal even after the size and firm performance are controlled for. Both acquiring and acquired CEOs are found to make the significantly higher compensation than the matched sample firms in the same industry and calendar year. We also find that executives with higher managerial power, as measured by a lower salary-based compensation mix, prior to a corporate acquisition are more likely to receive a higher executive pay in the year of acquisition. The association between executive compensation and managerial power seems to be stronger for acquired firms than for acquiring firms in corporate acquisition. Overall, our findings suggest that corporate acquisition has higher impacts on executive compensation for acquired firm CEOs than for acquiring firm CEOs.


2018 ◽  
pp. 1
Author(s):  
مريع سعد الهباش ◽  
صالح علي فراج العقلا
Keyword(s):  

2013 ◽  
Vol 21 (12) ◽  
pp. 2144-2153 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hui KOU ◽  
Yanhua SU ◽  
Yan ZHANG ◽  
Fanchang KONG ◽  
Yuanyan HU ◽  
...  

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