State enforceability of noncompete agreements: Regulations that stifle productivity!

2017 ◽  
Vol 57 (1) ◽  
pp. 341-354 ◽  
Author(s):  
Smriti Anand ◽  
Iftekhar Hasan ◽  
Priyanka Sharma ◽  
Haizhi Wang
Keyword(s):  
Noncompete Agreements

Low-Wage Workers and the Enforceability of Noncompete Agreements

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Lipsitz ◽  
Evan Starr
Keyword(s):  
Labor Market ◽  
Occupational Status ◽  
Job Mobility ◽  
Female Workers ◽  
Salaried Workers ◽  
Wage Effects ◽  
Wage Distributions ◽  
Noncompete Agreements ◽  
Hourly Workers ◽  
The Impact

We exploit the 2008 Oregon ban on noncompete agreements (NCAs) for hourly-paid workers to provide the first evidence on the impact of NCAs on low-wage workers. We find that banning NCAs for hourly workers increased hourly wages by 2%–3% on average. Since only a subset of workers sign NCAs, scaling this estimate by the prevalence of NCA use in the hourly-paid population suggests that the effect on employees actually bound by NCAs may be as great as 14%–21%, though the true effect is likely lower due to labor market spillovers onto those not bound by NCAs. Whereas the positive wage effects are found across the age, education, and wage distributions, they are stronger for female workers and in occupations where NCAs are more common. The Oregon low-wage NCA ban also improved average occupational status in Oregon, raised job-to-job mobility, and increased the proportion of salaried workers without affecting hours worked. This paper was accepted by Lamar Pierce, organizations.

Physician Practice Organization and Negotiated Prices: Evidence from State Law Changes

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 258-296
Author(s):  
Naomi Hausman ◽  
Kurt Lavetti
Keyword(s):  
Economies Of Scale ◽  
State Level ◽  
Organizational Structures ◽  
Physician Practice ◽  
Fixed Costs ◽  
State Law ◽  
Practice Organization ◽  
Percent Increase ◽  
Noncompete Agreements ◽  
The Relationship

We study the relationship between physician organizational structures and prices negotiated with private insurers. Using variation caused by state-level judicial law changes, we show that a 10 percent increase in the enforceability of noncompete agreements (NCAs) causes 4.3 percent higher physician prices, and declines in practice sizes and concentration. Using two databases containing every physician establishment and firm between 1996 and 2007, linked to negotiated prices, we show that larger practices have lower prices for services with high fixed costs, consistent with economies of scale. In contrast, increases in firm concentration conditional on establishment concentration leads to higher prices. (JEL D24, G22, I11, J44, K22, L13)

Are noncompete agreements generally enforceable in nursing?

Nursing ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 47 (4) ◽  
pp. 14-15
Author(s):  
Kristopher T. Starr
Keyword(s):  
Noncompete Agreements

CEO Noncompete Agreements, Job Risk, and Compensation

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Omesh Kini ◽  
Ryan Williams ◽  
Sirui Yin
Keyword(s):  
State Level ◽  
Job Mobility ◽  
Incentive Pay ◽  
Total Compensation ◽  
Performance Sensitivity ◽  
Noncompete Agreements ◽  
Personal Costs ◽  
Identification Strategy

Abstract Using hand-collected data on CEO noncompete agreements (NCAs), we find that NCAs are less common when CEOs expect to incur greater personal costs from reduced job mobility and more common when firms expect to suffer greater economic harm if departing CEOs leave to work for a competitor. Additionally, turnover-performance sensitivity is stronger when CEOs have NCAs. Finally, total compensation and incentive pay are higher if CEOs have more enforceable NCAs. Our identification strategy exploits staggered state-level changes in NCA enforceability. Overall, our findings suggest that restrictions on job mobility have important implications for how CEOs are monitored and compensated.

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