scholarly journals LINK BETWEEN PAY FOR PERFORMANCE INCENTIVES AND PHYSICIAN PAYMENT MECHANISMS: EVIDENCE FROM THE DIABETES MANAGEMENT INCENTIVE IN ONTARIO

2012 ◽  
Vol 22 (12) ◽  
pp. 1417-1439 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jasmin Kantarevic ◽  
Boris Kralj
Keyword(s):  
Diabetes Management ◽  
Pay For Performance ◽  
Physician Payment ◽  
Performance Incentives ◽  
Payment Mechanisms

scholarly journals Association of practice size and pay-for-performance incentives with the quality of diabetes management in primary care

2011 ◽  
Vol 183 (12) ◽  
pp. E809-E816 ◽  
Author(s):  
E. P. Vamos ◽  
U. J. Pape ◽  
A. Bottle ◽  
F. L. Hamilton ◽  
V. Curcin ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Primary Care ◽  
Diabetes Management ◽  
Pay For Performance ◽  
Performance Incentives ◽  
Practice Size

Cost-Effectiveness of Hospital Pay-for-Performance Incentives

2006 ◽  
Vol 63 (1_suppl) ◽  
pp. 49S-72S ◽  
Author(s):  
Tammie A. Nahra ◽  
Kristin L. Reiter ◽  
Richard A. Hirth ◽  
Janet E. Shermer ◽  
John R. C. Wheeler
Keyword(s):  
Cost Effectiveness ◽  
Pay For Performance ◽  
Performance Incentives

scholarly journals Perverse Incentives with Pay for Performance: Cover Crops in the Chesapeake Bay Watershed

2013 ◽  
Vol 42 (3) ◽  
pp. 491-507
Author(s):  
Darrell J. Bosch ◽  
James W. Pease ◽  
Robert Wieland ◽  
Doug Parker
Keyword(s):  
Cover Crops ◽  
Pay For Performance ◽  
Nitrogen And Phosphorus ◽  
Performance Incentives ◽  
Chesapeake Bay Watershed ◽  
Incentive Programs ◽  
Run Off ◽  
Perverse Incentives ◽  
And Performance ◽  
The Cost

Policymakers are concerned about nitrogen and phosphorus export to water bodies. Exports may be reduced by paying farmers to adopt practices to reduce runoff or by paying performance incentives tied to estimated run-off reductions. We evaluate the cost-effectiveness of practice and performance incentives for reducing nitrogen exports. Performance incentives potentially improve farm-level and allocative efficiencies relative to practice incentives. However, the efficiency improvements can be undermined by baseline shifts when growers adopt crops that enhance the performance payments but cause more pollution. Policymakers must carefully specify rules for performance-incentive programs and payments to avoid such baseline shifting.

scholarly journals Do pay-for-performance incentives lead to a better health outcome?

2018 ◽  
Vol 56 (6) ◽  
pp. 2167-2184
Author(s):  
Alina Peluso ◽  
Paolo Berta ◽  
Veronica Vinciotti
Keyword(s):  
Health Outcome ◽  
Pay For Performance ◽  
Performance Incentives

scholarly journals Treatment and referral decisions under different physician payment mechanisms

2011 ◽  
Vol 30 (5) ◽  
pp. 880-893 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marie Allard ◽  
Izabela Jelovac ◽  
Pierre Thomas Léger
Keyword(s):  
Physician Payment ◽  
Referral Decisions ◽  
Payment Mechanisms

scholarly journals Quality-Based Payment for Medical Groups and Individual Physicians

2009 ◽  
Vol 46 (2) ◽  
pp. 172-181 ◽  
Author(s):  
James C. Robinson ◽  
Stephen M. Shortell ◽  
Diane R. Rittenhouse ◽  
Sara Fernandes-Taylor ◽  
Robin R. Gillies ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Primary Care ◽  
Patient Satisfaction ◽  
Primary Care Physicians ◽  
Pay For Performance ◽  
Fee For Service ◽  
Performance Incentives ◽  
Payment Incentives ◽  
Medical Groups ◽  
Bonus Payments ◽  
Service Basis

This paper measures the extent to which medical groups experience external pay-for-performance incentives based on quality and patient satisfaction and the extent to which these groups pay their primary care and specialist physicians using similar criteria. Over half (52%) of large medical groups received bonus payments from health insurance plans in the period 2006–2007 based on measures of quality and patient satisfaction. Medical groups facing external pay-for-performance incentives are more likely to pay their primary care physicians (odds ratio [OR] 4.5; p<.001) and specialists (OR 2.5; p=.07) based on quality and satisfaction. Groups facing capitation payment incentives to control costs are more likely to pay member physicians on salary and less likely to pay based on productivity (p<.001 for primary care; p<.05 for specialists) than groups paid by insurers on a fee-for-service basis.

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