scholarly journals Oil volatility and the option value of waiting: An analysis of the G-7

2010 ◽  
Vol 31 (7) ◽  
pp. 679-702 ◽  
Author(s):  
Don Bredin ◽  
John Elder ◽  
Stilianos Fountas
2010 ◽  
Vol 12 (01) ◽  
pp. 37-59 ◽  
Author(s):  
CESARE DOSI ◽  
MICHELE MORETTO

The paper analyses the timing of spontaneous environmental innovation when second-mover advantages, arising from the expectation of declining investment costs, increase the option value of waiting created by investment irreversibility and uncertainty about private payoffs. We then focus on the design of public subsidies aimed at bridging the gap between the spontaneous time of technological change and the socially desirable one. Under network externalities and incomplete information about firms' switching costs, auctioning investment grants appears to be a cost-effective way of accelerating pollution abatement, in that it allows targeting grants instead of subsidizing the entire industry indiscriminately.


2016 ◽  
Vol 40 (6) ◽  
pp. 563-589 ◽  
Author(s):  
Roberto Basile ◽  
Jaewon Lim

Traditional “Marshallian” theories predict a linear relationship between internal migration and regional wage differentials. Using panel data on gross place-to-place migration flows in the United States, we estimate a semiparametric version of the modified gravity model and find evidence of a nonlinear effect of wage differentials in line with alternative theories of interregional migration, including the “option value of waiting” theory, liquidity constraints, and wealth-conditioned immobility. Traditionally, the migration decision process is believed to be mainly composed of two criteria: “whether to move” and “where to move.” However, the empirical evidence of nonlinearity found in this study supports the potential presence of another important decision criterion, “when to move” on interregional migration.


2003 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Anil Arya ◽  
Jonathan Glover

Abstract In this paper, limited managerial capacity gives rise to a timing option: agents can implement projects now-or-later. Because each agent cares only about the project he implements, while the principal cares about the projects undertaken in aggregate, the timing option may be valued differently by the principal and the agents. Under a fair assignment rule (one that treats the agents symmetrically), these conflicting valuations result in agents sometimes not implementing the principal's desired projects. We identify conditions under which the optimal assignment rule necessarily exhibits favoritism. Favoritism is beneficial because it provides appropriate incentives to the unfavored agent by reducing his option value of waiting.


2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas R. Covert ◽  
Ryan Kellogg
Keyword(s):  

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