The use of natural systems to remediate groundwater: Department of energy experience at the Savannah river site

2003 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 55-73
Author(s):  
Gerald C. Blount ◽  
Cathleen C. Caldwell ◽  
Joao E. Cardoso-Neto ◽  
Karen R. Conner ◽  
G. T. Jannik ◽  
...  
2002 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 43-61 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gerald C. Blount ◽  
Cathleen C. Caldwell ◽  
Joao E. Cardoso-Neto ◽  
Karen R. Conner ◽  
G. T. Jannik ◽  
...  

Author(s):  
James K. Chan ◽  
John W. Ramsey

This paper describes the current pressure protection program at Savannah River Site (SRS), a Department of Energy chemical processing and nuclear material handling facility in Aiken, South Carolina. It gives a brief description of the design requirements based on ASME, API, CGA, and ASHRAE Codes. Equipment and systems requiring pressure protection at SRS are primarily pressure vessels, steam stations, process chemical systems, refrigerant and cryogenic systems and other air or gas systems. It is understood that any pressure protection program is built on five fundamental areas of responsibility: procurement, verification, registration, inspection, and repair. This paper focuses on the existing process of facility pressure protection evaluation for code compliance followed by identification of failure scenarios and system design requirements, valve selection and sizing, and verification record generation. Improvements to this process are recognized and discussed. They include the development of a computer program to perform pressure protection evaluation and generate verification records. The software would process all applicable pressure protection calculations using improved methodologies. All relevant data required would be accessible within the program. Pressure safety relief device attributes and system parameters would be displayed. The computer program would enhance design consistency, improve quality and plant safety, and make the pressure protection verification process more efficient and cost effective.


Author(s):  
Robert W. Watkins ◽  
Bradley M. Loftin ◽  
Don S. Hoang

The U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) Specification 6M packaging was in extensive use for more than 40 years for in-commerce shipments of Type B quantities of fissile and radioactive material (RAM) across the USA, among the Department of Energy (DOE) laboratories, and between facilities in the DOE production complex. In January 2004, the DOT Research and Special Programs Administration (RSPA) Agency issued a final rule in the Federal Register to amend requirements in the Hazardous Materials Regulations (HMR) pertaining to the transportation of radioactive materials. The final rule became effective on October 1, 2004. One of those changes discontinued the use of the DOT specification 6M, along with other DOT specification packagings, on October 1, 2008. A main driver for the change was due to the fact that 6M specification packagings were not supported by a Safety Analysis Report for Packagings (SARP) that was compliant with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 71 (10 CFR 71). The regulatory rules for the discontinued use have been edited in Title 49 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Parts 100 – 185, 2004 Edition and thereafter. Prior to October 1, 2008, the use of the 6M within the boundaries of the Savannah River Site (SRS), called an onsite transfer, was governed by an onsite transportation document that referenced 49 CFR Parts 100 – 185. SRS had to develop an Onsite Safety Assessment (OSA) which was independent of 49 CFR in order to justify the continued use of the DOT Specification 6M for the transfer of radioactive material (RAM) at the SRS after October 1, 2008. This paper will discuss the methodology for and difficulties associated with authorizing the DOT Specification 6M Packaging for continued use at the Savannah River Site.


Author(s):  
Lucas L. Kyriazidis ◽  
Steve J. Hensel ◽  
Jeff M. Jordan

Storage of plutonium bearing materials at the US Department of Energy Savannah River Site (SRS) typically are packaged in DOE-STD-3013 welded containers which are stored in 9975 shipping packages. However, some materials are packaged in non-welded metal containers which consist of a can-bag-can configuration. These non-welded containers and the 9975 package provide safe containment of the plutonium bearing materials. Additionally, the materials must be stabilized such that adverse reactions do not occur during storage. Lastly, a surveillance program of these containers provides field and laboratory data with respect to package aging and potential degradation. The packaging, material stabilization, and surveillance requirements are identified in an Interim Safe Storage Criteria (ISSC) Program at SRS. This paper provides a high level overview of the ISSC program. Interim storage is defined as the storage prior to long term plutonium disposition.


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