scholarly journals Evolutionary robustness of killer meiotic drives

2021 ◽  
Vol 5 (5) ◽  
pp. 541-550
Author(s):  
Philip G. Madgwick ◽  
Jason B. Wolf
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionary Robustness

scholarly journals Friendly-rivalry solution to the iterated n-person public-goods game

2021 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. e1008217
Author(s):  
Yohsuke Murase ◽  
Seung Ki Baek
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
The Other ◽  
Fixation Probability ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Excellent Performance ◽  
Repeated Interaction ◽  
Evolutionary Simulation ◽  
Evolutionary Robustness ◽  
Full Cooperation

Repeated interaction promotes cooperation among rational individuals under the shadow of future, but it is hard to maintain cooperation when a large number of error-prone individuals are involved. One way to construct a cooperative Nash equilibrium is to find a ‘friendly-rivalry’ strategy, which aims at full cooperation but never allows the co-players to be better off. Recently it has been shown that for the iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma in the presence of error, a friendly rival can be designed with the following five rules: Cooperate if everyone did, accept punishment for your own mistake, punish defection, recover cooperation if you find a chance, and defect in all the other circumstances. In this work, we construct such a friendly-rivalry strategy for the iterated n-person public-goods game by generalizing those five rules. The resulting strategy makes a decision with referring to the previous m = 2n − 1 rounds. A friendly-rivalry strategy for n = 2 inherently has evolutionary robustness in the sense that no mutant strategy has higher fixation probability in this population than that of a neutral mutant. Our evolutionary simulation indeed shows excellent performance of the proposed strategy in a broad range of environmental conditions when n = 2 and 3.

European Union in Counter-Crisis Competition of Power Centers: Potential, Realities, Hopes

2013 ◽  
pp. 68-77
Author(s):  
K. Voronov
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Gdp Growth ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Historical Experience ◽  
The World ◽  
The Usa ◽  
Evolutionary Robustness ◽  
Power Centers ◽  
Macroeconomic Growth ◽  
The Eu

Despite the crisis, the economy of the European Union remains to be the largest in the world. The economic mechanism of the EU is rather differentiated. It has a great historical experience and possesses sufficient evolutionary robustness. Currently, the former relationships between the EU and the USA undergo substantial changes and new forms emerge. For both of them the greatest challenge is presented by China which in recent decades shows the solid rates of GDP growth. Supposedly, Chines economy will become the world largest on in the new future. Under such conditions the Old World has to conduct a persistent search for new sources of its successful macroeconomic growth.

Homology: a synthetic concept of evolutionary robustness of patterns

2007 ◽  
Vol 36 (3) ◽  
pp. 281-289 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nikolaus U. Szucsich ◽  
Christian S. Wirkner
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionary Robustness

Does Social Exploitation within Pathogen Populations Pose an Opportunity for Novel Therapeutic Approaches?

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sam P. Brown
Keyword(s):  
Social Behaviors ◽  
Bacterial Virulence ◽  
Wild Type ◽  
Chemical Induction ◽  
Therapeutic Approaches ◽  
Virulence Traits ◽  
Evolutionary Robustness ◽  
Pathogen Populations ◽  
Type Infection ◽  
Novel Therapeutic

Bacterial virulence (damage to host) is often cooperative, with individual cells paying costs to promote collective exploitation. This chapter reviews how cooperative virulence traits offer novel therapeutic avenues involving either the genetic introduction or chemical induction of “cheats” that can socially exploit the cooperative wild-type infection. Issues of efficacy and evolutionary robustness are discussed, and evidence of an evolutionarily robust therapeutic that targets bacterial social behaviors is highlighted.

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