Security-constrained competitive mechanism research for the generation-side electricity market based on economic mechanism design theory

2016 ◽  
Vol 27 (3) ◽  
pp. e2285
Author(s):  
Yonggang Zhu ◽  
Liming Ying ◽  
Hu Xiong ◽  
Qingyang Xie
Keyword(s):  
Mechanism Design ◽  
Electricity Market ◽  
Design Theory ◽  
Economic Mechanism ◽  
Competitive Mechanism ◽  
Mechanism Research

scholarly journals QUANTUM MECHANISM HELPS AGENTS COMBAT "BAD" SOCIAL CHOICE RULES

2011 ◽  
Vol 09 (01) ◽  
pp. 615-623 ◽  
Author(s):  
HAOYANG WU
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Social Choice ◽  
Mechanism Design ◽  
Design Theory ◽  
Reverse Problem ◽  
Quantum Domain ◽  
Quantum Mechanism ◽  
Social Choice Rules ◽  
Quantum Strategies

Quantum strategies have been successfully applied to game theory for years. However, as a reverse problem of game theory, the theory of mechanism design is ignored by physicists. In this paper, the theory of mechanism design is generalized to a quantum domain. The main result is that by virtue of a quantum mechanism, agents who satisfy a certain condition can combat "bad" social choice rules instead of being restricted by the traditional mechanism design theory.

Game Strategy in Multi-User Shared Virtual Environment Based on Internet

2010 ◽  
Vol 26-28 ◽  
pp. 809-812
Author(s):  
Hai Dong Yu ◽  
Bo Tao Zhang ◽  
Yan Chun Wang
Keyword(s):  
Correlation Analysis ◽  
Mechanism Design ◽  
Virtual Environment ◽  
Design Theory ◽  
Imperfect Information ◽  
Correlation Network ◽  
Virtual Agents ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Dynamic Correlation ◽  
Distributed Virtual Environment

This paper proposed a new interests game model with dynamic correlation analysis in distributed virtual environment based on mechanism design theory. The game definitions in correlation network and interest matrix were given and an analysis approach to find out the interest focus of virtual agents and administrator was presented. Thus a prototype virtual environment game system was implemented to demonstrate the effects of our approach in optimizing the visual rendering process and highlighting the collaborative perception according to payoffs under imperfect information condition.

scholarly journals Optimizing maintenance service contracts through mechanism design theory

2016 ◽  
Vol 40 (21-22) ◽  
pp. 8849-8861 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sukhwa Hong ◽  
Christian Wernz ◽  
Jeffrey D. Stillinger
Keyword(s):  
Mechanism Design ◽  
Design Theory ◽  
Service Contracts ◽  
Maintenance Service

An Introduction to Mechanism Design Theory

2008 ◽  
Vol 56 (2) ◽  
pp. 137-165 ◽  
Author(s):  
Debasis Mishra
Keyword(s):  
Mechanism Design ◽  
Design Theory

scholarly journals Microfinance and Mechanism Design: The Role of Joint Liability and Cross-Reporting

2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zulkefly Abdul Karim
Keyword(s):  
Interest Rates ◽  
Mechanism Design ◽  
Design Theory ◽  
Credit Market ◽  
The State ◽  
Grameen Bank ◽  
Joint Liability ◽  
The Cross ◽  
Reporting Mechanism

Since the establishment of Grameen Bank in 1976 by Professor MuhammadYunus1, many economists have studied extensively, either theoretically or empirically, the success of the Grameen Bank in eradicating the poverty problem in Bangladesh. Therefore, this paper aims to apply the mechanism design theory in microfinance by examining the role of joint liability and cross reporting mechanism in the loan contract which is designed by microfinance lender. In doing so, this study simplified the joint liability mechanism proposed by Ghatak (1999, 2000) and cross-reporting mechanism by Rai and Sjostrom (2004). Based on the joint-liability mechanism, it is clearly stated that the microfinance lender can minimise or avoid the adverse selection problem in the credit market through peer selection and peer screening. In the meantime, the joint liability mechanism is better than individual lending in terms of increasing the social welfare among the poor borrower, charging lower interest rates, and generating high repayment rates. In contrast, Rai and Sjostrom (2004) argued that joint liability alone is not enough to efficiently induce borrowers to help each other. Indeed, the cross-reporting mechanism is also important for lenders in order to minimise the problem of asymmetric information in the credit market. The cross-reporting mechanism is also efficient because it can influence the borrower to be truthful-telling about the state of the project and subsequently can minimise the deadweight loss (punishment) among the borrowers. In comparison, without cross reporting, the lending mechanism is inefficient because the borrower will be imposed harsh punishment from the bank and the bank can undertake auditing or verify the state of the project and punish accordingly.   Keywords: Microfinance; mechanism design; joint liability; cross-reporting.  

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document