Reciprocity: Choice shift in a social trap

1989 ◽  
Vol 19 (4) ◽  
pp. 317-326 ◽  
Author(s):  
Henk A. M. Wilke ◽  
Jozé Braspenning
Keyword(s):  
Choice Shift ◽  
Social Trap

scholarly journals Choice Shifts in School Disciplinary Decision Making: Analysis of Age Differences of Panel Members

2020 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 86-94
Author(s):  
Peter J.O. Aloka
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Multivariate Analysis ◽  
Secondary Schools ◽  
Age Differences ◽  
Age Groups ◽  
Target Population ◽  
Ministry Of Education ◽  
Quasi Experimental ◽  
Choice Shift ◽  
Consistency Method

Background: Decision making is critical to each organization and it requires the ability to find a possible balance between risky and cautious decisions. The Kenyan secondary schools are mandated by the Ministry of Education to manage students’ misbehaviors by the disciplinary panels. Aim: The present study investigated the choice shifts in disciplinary decision making in Kenyan secondary schools based on age groups of the panel members. Methods: The Quasi-Experimental Pretest-Posttest Design was adopted. The study targeted 360 teachers- members of disciplinary panels in 45 secondary schools in the Rongo sub-county of Kenya. A sample size of 78 members of disciplinary panels in 10 secondary schools was involved. This was 22% of the target population of members of disciplinary panels in the Rongo district. The choice shift in decisions was ascertained using the Modified Choice Dilemma Questionnaire. The validity of the tools was ensured by the expert judgment by two Kenyan psychologists, while the reliability was determined using the internal consistency method and an alpha of 0.695 was reported. Results: The results of the Multivariate Analysis Of Variance indicated that there were differences in choice shifts from the pre to post-disciplinary hearing decisions among the members of selected school disciplinary panels on the basis of their age groups (Wilk’s Lambda (λ) test: F (12, 188) = 7.40, P = 0.000, P < 0.05). Conclusion: It was concluded that the age of the members of disciplinary panels influenced the nature of choice shifts in decisions. It was recommended that principals should ensure that the membership of school disciplinary panels is broad-based.

The actions of others as determinants of behavior in social trap situations

1983 ◽  
Vol 19 (6) ◽  
pp. 522-539 ◽  
Author(s):  
David A Schroeder ◽  
Thomas D Jensen ◽  
Andrew J Reed ◽  
Debra K Sullivan ◽  
Michael Schwab
Keyword(s):  
Social Trap

Explaining choice shift: An effects coded model

1985 ◽  
Vol 52 (1) ◽  
pp. 92-101 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael E. Mayer
Keyword(s):  
Choice Shift

Group Composition and Choice Shift: Implications for Administration.

1973 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. 412-422 ◽  
Author(s):  
E. A. Cecil ◽  
L. L. Cummings ◽  
J. M. Chertkoff
Keyword(s):  
Group Composition ◽  
Choice Shift

A Social Trap Analysis of the Management of Diversity

1996 ◽  
Vol 21 (3) ◽  
pp. 757 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bruce Barry ◽  
Thomas S. Bateman
Keyword(s):  
Social Trap

Choice Shift and Group Polarization

1999 ◽  
Vol 64 (6) ◽  
pp. 856 ◽  
Author(s):  
Noah E. Friedkin
Keyword(s):  
Group Polarization ◽  
Choice Shift

scholarly journals Sjálfakandi ökutæki á Íslandi: Viðhorf almennings gagnvart nýjum ferðamáta

2020 ◽  
Vol 26 ◽  
Author(s):  
Arnór B. Elvarsson ◽  
Haraldur Sigþórsson
Keyword(s):  
Underserved Populations ◽  
Mode Choice ◽  
Automated Vehicles ◽  
The Public ◽  
Road Users ◽  
Vulnerable Road Users ◽  
Similar Survey ◽  
Choice Shift ◽  
Demographic Attributes ◽  
Transport Problems

Automated vehicles (AVs) are sometimes considered a silver bullet for contemporary transport problems. For particular scenarios, the technology is believed to have many advantages, such as improving the accessibility of underserved populations. However, the technology may also lead to lesser consequences under other scenarios, with some simulations predicting increase in congestion as the modal split shifts towards automation. In any case, the mode choice shift will not be realised without the public acceptence of AVs. The public opinion towards the technology has not been fully explored, and particularly not in Iceland. This article focuses on the Icelandic results of a cross-national survey. 561 valid responses were recorded, considering attitudinal and stated-mode-choice questions and the responses then analysed as per the sample‘s socio-demographic attributes and compared to a similar survey performed in other european countries. The Icelandic public is generally more positive towards automated vehicles than other Europeans, however still skeptical. At the same time as AV passengers feel more safe than vulnerable road users in the vicinity of an AV, AV passengers also feel more safe with an AV supervisor inside the vehicle. It is uncertain whether people will use the vehicles for pick-up and drop-off of children. Respondents are generally more positive that their goods be transported in AVs instead of people. In spite of this, 70% of respondents were positive that the technology be tried in their neighborhood and 60% of respondents are positive towards trying the vehicles themselves. Further research is suggested in the outlook of the articles, based on indices and further metrics.

scholarly journals The evolution of anti-social rewarding and its countermeasures in public goods games

2015 ◽  
Vol 282 (1798) ◽  
pp. 20141994 ◽  
Author(s):  
Miguel dos Santos
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Public Good ◽  
Additional Condition ◽  
Social Dilemmas ◽  
Second Order ◽  
The Public ◽  
Common Pool ◽  
Public Goods Games ◽  
The Commons ◽  
Social Trap

Cooperation in joint enterprises can easily break down when self-interests are in conflict with collective benefits, causing a tragedy of the commons. In such social dilemmas, the possibility for contributors to invest in a common pool-rewards fund, which will be shared exclusively among contributors, can be powerful for averting the tragedy, as long as the second-order dilemma (i.e. withdrawing contribution to reward funds) can be overcome (e.g. with second-order sanctions). However, the present paper reveals the vulnerability of such pool-rewarding mechanisms to the presence of reward funds raised by defectors and shared among them (i.e. anti-social rewarding), as it causes a cooperation breakdown, even when second-order sanctions are possible. I demonstrate that escaping this social trap requires the additional condition that coalitions of defectors fare poorly compared with pro-socials, with either (i) better rewarding abilities for the latter or (ii) reward funds that are contingent upon the public good produced beforehand, allowing groups of contributors to invest more in reward funds than groups of defectors. These results suggest that the establishment of cooperation through a collective positive incentive mechanism is highly vulnerable to anti-social rewarding and requires additional countermeasures to act in combination with second-order sanctions.

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