System dynamics model for high‐speed railway operation safety supervision system based on evolutionary game theory

2018 ◽  
Vol 31 (10) ◽  
pp. e4743 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kehong Li ◽  
Yadong Zhang ◽  
Jin Guo ◽  
Xiaocheng Ge ◽  
Yuebin Su
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
System Dynamics ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
High Speed ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
System Dynamics Model ◽  
Dynamics Model ◽  
High Speed Railway ◽  
Supervision System ◽  
Railway Operation

scholarly journals A System Dynamics Model for Safety Supervision of Online Car-Hailing From an Evolutionary Game Theory Perspective

IEEE Access ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 8 ◽  
pp. 185045-185058
Author(s):  
Wenke Wang ◽  
Yan Zhang ◽  
Linyun Feng ◽  
Yenchun Jim Wu ◽  
Tseping Dong
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
System Dynamics ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
System Dynamics Model ◽  
Dynamics Model

scholarly journals SYSTEM DYNAMICS MODEL BASED ON EVOLUTIONARY GAME THEORY FOR QUALITY SUPERVISION AMONG CONSTRUCTION STAKEHOLDERS

2018 ◽  
Vol 24 (4) ◽  
pp. 318-330 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shengyu Guo ◽  
Pan Zhang ◽  
Jianying Yang
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
System Dynamics ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
System Dynamics Model ◽  
Dynamics Model ◽  
Model Based ◽  
Proposed Model ◽  
The Stability ◽  
The Impact

To address the gap, that is, few studies have explored the influence of the participants’ interactions with one another during construction quality supervision, this paper proposes a system dynamics model based on evolutionary game theory to describe the complex and dynamic interactions among tripartite stakeholders in China, including the project owner (PO), construction supervising engineer (CSE), and construction contractor (CC). First, the replicated dynamic equation set is established in terms of expense targets. Second, the equilibrium solutions of the equation set are obtained to test strategy options. The trends of system fluctuations caused by penalty and reward changes are also analyzed. Finally, the stability of the proposed model is improved by integrating a dynamic penalty–reward scenario into the evolutionary strategy of the PO. Simulation results show that: 1) the evolutionary stable strategy does not exist in initial interactions, 2) the degrees of penalty and reward considerably affect the CC’s rate variable, and 3) the dynamic penalty–reward scenario could effectively improve the stability of the proposed model. The unsteadiness of the quality supervision system and the stability control scenario could help in understanding the impact of interactions among stakeholders and provide suggestions for optimizing quality supervision procedures.

scholarly journals Game Modelling and Strategy Research on the System Dynamics–based Quadruplicate Evolution for High–speed Railway Operational Safety Supervision System

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (5) ◽  
pp. 1300 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kehong Li ◽  
Wenke Wang ◽  
Yadong Zhang ◽  
Tao Zheng ◽  
Jin Guo
Keyword(s):  
System Dynamics ◽  
High Speed ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Dynamics Simulation ◽  
Multiple Agents ◽  
Strategy Research ◽  
Safety Level ◽  
High Speed Railway ◽  
Supervision System ◽  
Safety Investment

In view of the entrusted transportation management model (ETMM) of China’s high–speed railway (HSR), the supervision strategy of an HSR company for its multiple agents plays a very important role in ensuring the safety and sustainable development of HSR. Due to the existence of multiple agents in ETMM, the supervision strategy for these agents is usually difficult to formulate. In this study, a quadruplicate HSR safety supervision system evolutionary game model composed of an HSR company and three agents was established through the analysis of the complex game relationship existing in the system. The behavioral characteristics and the steady state of decision–making of all stakeholders involved in the system are proved by evolutionary game theory and system dynamics simulation. The results show that there will be long–term fluctuations in the strategies selected by the four stakeholders in the static reward–penalty control scenario (RPCS), which indicates that an evolutionary stable strategy does not exist. With increases in the reward–penalty coefficient, the fluctuations are intensified. Therefore, the dynamic RPCS was proposed to control the fluctuations, and the simulation was repeated. The results show that the fluctuations can be effectively restrained by adopting the dynamic RPCS, but if the coefficients are the same, the static RPCS is better than the dynamic RPCS for increasing the safety investment rate of the three agents. This demonstrates that the HSR company should apply these two control scenarios flexibly according to the actual situation when formulating a supervision strategy in order to effectively control and enhance the safety level of HSR operations when multiple agents are involved.

scholarly journals Analysis of the Cooperation Strategies Between HSR Express and Express Companies Based on Evolutionary Game Theory

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wenqin Cao ◽  
Xiang Xu
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Cost Sharing ◽  
High Speed ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Excess Returns ◽  
High Speed Railway ◽  
Factors Influencing ◽  
The Cost

Using evolutionary game theory, the factors influencing the cooperation between high-speed railway express and express companies were further investigated. The results show that the evolutionary game path of the system is related to the excess returns, cooperation costs, excess returns, cost-sharing allocation coefficients and default amounts of both sides in the payment matrix. Specifically, when the excess returns are greater than the cost of cooperation, the two parties can cooperate, and the probability of cooperation is positively related to the excess returns and negatively related to the cost of cooperation. Penalties affect the possibility of cooperation between the two parties and are related to the parameters of cooperation.

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