What is the impact of financial incentives on the quality of health care provided by primary care physicians?

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jane Burch ◽  
Sera Tort
Author(s):  
Anthony Scott ◽  
Sivey Peter ◽  
Driss Ait Ouakrim ◽  
Lisa Willenberg ◽  
Lucio Naccerella ◽  
...  

1998 ◽  
Vol 76 (4) ◽  
pp. 649-686 ◽  
Author(s):  
R. Adams Dudley ◽  
Robert H. Miller ◽  
Tamir Y. Korenbrot ◽  
Harold S. Luft

Author(s):  
Nguyen Thi Hoa ◽  
Anselme Derese ◽  
Jeffrey F. Markuns ◽  
Nguyen Minha Tam ◽  
Wim Peersman

Abstract Aim: To adapt the provider version of the Primary Care Assessment Tool (PCAT) for Vietnam and determine its internal consistency and validity. Background: There is a growing need to measure and explore the impact of various characteristics of health care systems on the quality of primary care. It would provide the best evidence for policy makers if these evaluations come from both the demand and supply sides of the health care sector. Comparatively more researchers have studied primary care quality from the consumer perspective than from the provider’s perspective. This study aims at the latter. Method: Our study translated and adapted the PCAT provider version (PCAT PE) into a Vietnamese version, after which a cross-sectional survey was conducted to examine the feasibility, internal consistency and validity of the Vietnamese PCAT provider version (VN PCAT PE). All general doctors working at 152 commune health centres in Thua Thien Hue province had been selected to participate in the survey. Findings: The VN PCAT PE is an instrument for evaluation of primary care in Vietnam with 116 items comprising six scales representing four core primary care domains, and three additional scales representing three derivative domains. From the translation and cultural adaptation stage, two items were combined, two items were removed and one item was added. Six other items were excluded due to problems in item-total correlations. All items have a low non-response or ‘don’t know/don’t remember’ response rate, and there were no floor or ceiling effects. All scales had a Cronbach’s alpha above 0.80, except for the Coordination scale, which still was above the minimum level of 0.70. Conclusion: The VN PCAT PE demonstrates adequate internal consistency and validity to be used as an effective tool for measuring the quality of primary care in Vietnam from the provider perspective.


2013 ◽  
Vol 5 (4) ◽  
pp. 134-166 ◽  
Author(s):  
Martin Gaynor ◽  
Rodrigo Moreno-Serra ◽  
Carol Propper

The effect of competition on the quality of health care remains a contested issue. Most empirical estimates rely on inference from nonexperimental data. In contrast, this paper exploits a procompetitive policy reform to provide estimates of the impact of competition on hospital outcomes. The English government introduced a policy in 2006 to promote competition between hospitals. Using this policy to implement a difference-in-differences research design, we estimate the impact of the introduction of competition on not only clinical outcomes but also productivity and expenditure. We find that the effect of competition is to save lives without raising costs. (JEL H51, I11, I18, L32, L33)


2007 ◽  
Vol 65 (3) ◽  
pp. 300-314 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chuan-Fen Liu ◽  
Michael K. Chapko ◽  
Mark W. Perkins ◽  
John Fortney ◽  
Matthew L. Maciejewski

2017 ◽  
Vol 67 (664) ◽  
pp. e800-e815 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rishi Mandavia ◽  
Nishchay Mehta ◽  
Anne Schilder ◽  
Elias Mossialos

BackgroundProvider financial incentives are being increasingly adopted to help improve standards of care while promoting efficiency.AimTo review the UK evidence on whether provider financial incentives are an effective way of improving the quality of health care.Design and settingSystematic review of UK evidence, undertaken in accordance with Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses (PRISMA) recommendations.MethodMEDLINE and Embase databases were searched in August 2016. Original articles that assessed the relationship between UK provider financial incentives and a quantitative measure of quality of health care were included. Studies showing improvement for all measures of quality of care were defined as ‘positive’, those that were ‘intermediate’ showed improvement in some measures, and those classified as ‘negative’ showed a worsening of measures. Studies showing no effect were documented as such. Quality was assessed using the Downs and Black quality checklist.ResultsOf the 232 published articles identified by the systematic search, 28 were included. Of these, nine reported positive effects of incentives on quality of care, 16 reported intermediate effects, two reported no effect, and one reported a negative effect. Quality assessment scores for included articles ranged from 15 to 19, out of a maximum of 22 points.ConclusionThe effects of UK provider financial incentives on healthcare quality are unclear. Owing to this uncertainty and their significant costs, use of them may be counterproductive to their goal of improving healthcare quality and efficiency. UK policymakers should be cautious when implementing these incentives — if used, they should be subject to careful long-term monitoring and evaluation. Further research is needed to assess whether provider financial incentives represent a cost-effective intervention to improve the quality of care delivered in the UK.


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