Legislative Watch: State legislative bills

Recent state legislation regulating fantasy sports contests may present a different type of threat to the nascent fantasy sports industry—the possibility that the U.S. Attorney General (or others) could invoke PASPA to enjoin the state law. This is the same law that prohibits states from legalizing traditional, single-game sports betting. Although PASPA has not yet surfaced as an obstacle to state legalization of DFS, it may emerge as an important issue as additional state legislative measures are introduced, particularly with a new U.S. Attorney General potentially taking a harder look at Internet gambling generally. Further, as more and more states begin passing laws legalizing daily fantasy sports contests, many have begun to question why some forms of sports gambling are allowed but not others. This chapter examines how PASPA could apply to state-sanctioned fantasy sports and provides an analytical framework for assessing the viability of such legislation under PASPA.

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State Minimum Wage Laws as a Response to Federal Inaction

State and Local Government Review ◽

10.1177/0160323x211000824 ◽

2021 ◽

pp. 0160323X2110008

Author(s):

Shanna Rose

Keyword(s):

Minimum Wage ◽

Federal Policy ◽

Minimum Wages ◽

Annual Rate ◽

Policy Agenda ◽

State Activity ◽

Dollar Amount ◽

Ballot Measure ◽

State Legislative

This article analyzes state legislative and ballot measure activity related to the minimum wage between 2003 and 2020. The analysis distinguishes proposals to raise the minimum wage from those to index it to the annual rate of inflation, and examines the proposed dollar amount, the process used (legislation vs. ballot measure), and the measure’s success or failure. The analysis suggests that state activity tends to increase when the minimum wage rises on the federal policy agenda, and that partisanship and ideology also play a central role in efforts to raise and index state minimum wages.

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How Much of the Incumbency Advantage is Due to Scare-Off?

Political Science Research and Methods ◽

10.1017/psrm.2014.43 ◽

2015 ◽

Vol 3 (3) ◽

pp. 493-514 ◽

Cited By ~ 26

Author(s):

Andrew B. Hall ◽

James M. Snyder

Keyword(s):

Regression Discontinuity ◽

Regression Discontinuity Design ◽

Incumbency Advantage ◽

Previous Election ◽

Us Senate ◽

State Legislative

This paper uses a regression discontinuity design to estimate the degree to which incumbents scare off challengers with previous officeholder experience. The estimates indicate a surprisingly small amount of scare-off, at least in cases where the previous election was nearly tied. As Lee and others have shown (and as we confirm for our samples) the estimated party incumbency advantage in these same cases is quite large—in fact, it is about as large as the average incumbency advantage for all races found using other approaches. Drawing from previous estimates of the electoral value of officeholder experience, we thus calculate that scare-off in these cases accounts for only about 5–7 percent of the party incumbency advantage. We show that these patterns are similar in elections for US House seats, statewide offices and US senate seats, and state legislative seats.

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