The effect of an initial cooperative or competitive treatment upon a subject's response to conditional cooperation

1967 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 301-313 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vello Sermat
Keyword(s):  
Conditional Cooperation ◽  
Competitive Treatment

Evolution of Conditional Cooperation in Prisoner's Dilemma

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ali Seyhun Saral
Keyword(s):  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Social Dilemma ◽  
Conditional Cooperation ◽  
Psychological Mechanisms ◽  
Medium Level ◽  
Emergence Of Cooperation ◽  
Initial Move ◽  
Evolutionary Success ◽  
Strategy Types

Conditional cooperation has been a common explanation for the observed cooperation, and its decline in social dilemma experiments. Numerous studies showed that most of the experimental subjects can be categorized into three types: conditional cooperators, self-maximizers and hump-shaped (triangle) cooperators. In this study, I investigate conditional strategy types and their role on the emergence of cooperation and their evolutionary success. For this purpose, I use an extension of the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma Game. The agents are characterized by their initial move and their conditional responses to each level of cooperation. By using simulations, I estimate the likelihood of cooperation for different probability of continuations.I show that, when the continuation probability is sufficiently large, high levels cooperation is achieved. In this case, the most successful strategies are those who employ an all-or-none type of conditional cooperation, followed by perfect conditional cooperators. In intermediate levels of continuation probabilities, however, hump-shaped contributor types are the ones that are most likely to thrive, followed by imperfect conditional cooperators. Those agents cooperate in a medium level of cooperation within themselves and each other. The results explain the existence of hump-shaped type of cooperators with a purely payoff-based reasoning, as opposed to previous attempts to explain this strategy with psychological mechanisms.

scholarly journals Contextualised strong reciprocity explains selfless cooperation despite selfish intuitions and weak social heuristics

2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ozan Isler ◽  
Simon Gächter ◽  
A. John Maule ◽  
Chris Starmer
Keyword(s):  
Social Dilemma ◽  
The Self ◽  
Self Control ◽  
Conditional Cooperation ◽  
Strong Reciprocity ◽  
Time Patterns ◽  
The Social ◽  
Primary Driver ◽  
Collective Benefit ◽  
Research And Policy

AbstractHumans frequently cooperate for collective benefit, even in one-shot social dilemmas. This provides a challenge for theories of cooperation. Two views focus on intuitions but offer conflicting explanations. The Social Heuristics Hypothesis argues that people with selfish preferences rely on cooperative intuitions and predicts that deliberation reduces cooperation. The Self-Control Account emphasizes control over selfish intuitions and is consistent with strong reciprocity—a preference for conditional cooperation in one-shot dilemmas. Here, we reconcile these explanations with each other as well as with strong reciprocity. We study one-shot cooperation across two main dilemma contexts, provision and maintenance, and show that cooperation is higher in provision than maintenance. Using time-limit manipulations, we experimentally study the cognitive processes underlying this robust result. Supporting the Self-Control Account, people are intuitively selfish in maintenance, with deliberation increasing cooperation. In contrast, consistent with the Social Heuristics Hypothesis, deliberation tends to increase the likelihood of free-riding in provision. Contextual differences between maintenance and provision are observed across additional measures: reaction time patterns of cooperation; social dilemma understanding; perceptions of social appropriateness; beliefs about others’ cooperation; and cooperation preferences. Despite these dilemma-specific asymmetries, we show that preferences, coupled with beliefs, successfully predict the high levels of cooperation in both maintenance and provision dilemmas. While the effects of intuitions are context-dependent and small, the widespread preference for strong reciprocity is the primary driver of one-shot cooperation. We advance the Contextualised Strong Reciprocity account as a unifying framework and consider its implications for research and policy.

scholarly journals Limited memory optimizes cooperation in social dilemma experiments

2021 ◽  
Vol 8 (8) ◽  
pp. 210653
Author(s):  
Shuangmei Ma ◽  
Boyu Zhang ◽  
Shinan Cao ◽  
Jun S. Liu ◽  
Wen-Xu Wang
Keyword(s):  
Working Memory ◽  
Replicator Dynamics ◽  
Working Memory Capacity ◽  
Social Dilemma ◽  
Cultural Influences ◽  
Memory Capacity ◽  
Neural Function ◽  
Human Society ◽  
Neural Basis ◽  
Conditional Cooperation

Cooperation is one of the key collective behaviours of human society. Despite discoveries of several social mechanisms underpinning cooperation, relatively little is known about how our neural functions affect cooperative behaviours. Here, we study the effect of a main neural function, working-memory capacity, on cooperation in repeated Prisoner's Dilemma experiments. Our experimental paradigm overcomes the obstacles in measuring and changing subjects' working-memory capacity. We find that the optimal cooperation level occurs when subjects remember two previous rounds of information, and cooperation increases abruptly from no memory capacity to minimal memory capacity. The results can be explained by memory-based conditional cooperation of subjects. We propose evolutionary models based on replicator dynamics and Markov processes, respectively, which are in good agreement with experimental results of different memory capacities. Our experimental findings differ from previous hypotheses and predictions of existent models and theories, and suggest a neural basis and evolutionary roots of cooperation beyond cultural influences.

scholarly journals Conditional Cooperation and Betrayal Aversion

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robin Cubitt ◽  
Simon Gachter ◽  
Simone Quercia
Keyword(s):  
Conditional Cooperation ◽  
Betrayal Aversion

scholarly journals COVID-19 and Behavioral Economics: Certain Aspects of the Causes of Irrational Behaviour During a Pandemic

2021 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 118-121
Author(s):  
Maksym Synytsya
Keyword(s):  
Behavioural Economics ◽  
Main Task ◽  
Conditional Cooperation ◽  
Economic Agents ◽  
Work Effectiveness ◽  
Practical Research ◽  
Methods Of Synthesis ◽  
Irrational Behaviour ◽  
Coronavirus Infection ◽  
Material Values

The aim of this article is to reveal the main reasons for the irrational behaviour of economic agents during the COVID-19 coronavirus pandemic in terms of behavioural economics and opportunities for change such a behaviour.The article reveals the approaches that were used in 2020 and continue to be used today as the main ones to prevent the spread of coronavirus infection. Despite the existence of such prescriptions, the infection continues to spread and causes negative socio-economic consequences.Thus, the main reasons, the resistance of citizens to the measures recommended by governments around the world and the manifestation of deviant behaviour among the seemingly “rational” economic agents were analyzed.The main reasons and possible factors for changing such a behaviour are the postulates of behavioural economics, such as the effect of reinforcement effect, conservative bias, confirmation bias, conditional cooperation, the preference of beliefs consonance.In addition, this paper provides a brief overview of some post-material values of Ukrainian society based on global research and offers an assessment of the dependence of these values on the incidence of COVID-19 and an explanation in terms of behavioural economics.The article notes that the presence of certain established views on the “normality” of preventive antivirus measures may affect the propensity or the lack of propensity to adhere to the necessary protective behaviour by economic agents.The research methods are descriptive, analytical, methods of synthesis and comparison. As a result of the analysis, the article proposes a comprehensive approach to men’s behaviour during the pandemic according to behavioural economics.The study concludes that the main task to improve the effectiveness of preventive measures for the spread of COVID-19 today is to understand the causes of irrational behaviour in new circumstances in terms of behavioural economics and apply the theory of “pushing” or “nudging” to form positive social economic change. It is suggested to use this paper for further and deeper practical research of certain aspects of changing people`s behaviour for better work effectiveness and wellbeing. JEL classіfіcatіon: D03, A13

scholarly journals Managing Leadership in the Indo-Pacific: The United States’ South Asia Strategy Revisited

2017 ◽  
Vol 03 (04) ◽  
pp. 463-480
Author(s):  
Xiaoping Yang
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
South Asia ◽  
Cost Benefit Analysis ◽  
Cost Benefit ◽  
Balance Of Power ◽  
The United States ◽  
Leadership Role ◽  
Conditional Cooperation ◽  
United States South ◽  
Strategic Objective

The United States’ South Asia strategy has been based on the calculation of its overall national security priorities. In practice, when U.S. priorities are at odds with those of other regional powers, Washington tends to adopt a “no-expectations” psychological approach toward its regional partners to avoid disappointment, a technical “de-hyphenation strategy” to improve policy efficiency, and practical cost-benefit analysis to evaluate the effectiveness of its South Asia strategy. However, Washington often has to come to terms with the realities on the ground with regard to its leadership role in South Asia. For the time being, Washington has articulated its strategic objective in South Asia, that is, a regional balance of power in favor of the United States vis-a-vis its perceived competitor, China. Therefore, it has conducted conditional cooperation with Pakistan and Afghanistan on land, and committed support for India on security issues in the Indian Ocean, so as to hedge against China’s growing presence in South Asia. The enhancement of U.S.-India defense and security cooperation has fueled China’s suspicion of India’s intention to join the U.S.-led coalition against it. By the logic of balance of power, the United States will continue to regard India as a strategic counterweight to China, which is likely to increase the possibility of strategic tensions and conflicts between China and India that may finally entangle the United States.

Analisi della sostenibilitŕ economica di un sistema di sviluppo locale: simulazione ad agenti di configurazioni dei meccanismi cooperativi tra produttori

2009 ◽  
pp. 35-50
Author(s):  
Riccardo Boero
Keyword(s):  
Public Good ◽  
Formal Model ◽  
Local Development ◽  
Social Simulation ◽  
Public Good Provision ◽  
Conditional Cooperation ◽  
Agent Based ◽  
Development System ◽  
Cooperative Dynamics ◽  
Good Provision

- The author presents a formal model of cooperative dynamics in a local development system, with a specific focus on the evaluation of institutional interventions undertaken by stakeholders aiming at supporting cooperation.Keywords: agent-based social simulation, Slowfood presidia, voluntary public good provision, conditional cooperation, rural local development systems

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