A game theoretic analysis of congressional power distributions for a stable two-party system

2007 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 83-95 ◽  
Author(s):  
R. Duncan Luce ◽  
Arnold A. Rogow
Keyword(s):  
Party System ◽  
Theoretic Analysis ◽  
Game Theoretic Analysis ◽  
Game Theoretic

Party Coalitions in Multiparty Parliaments: A Game-Theoretic Analysis

1974 ◽  
Vol 68 (3) ◽  
pp. 1093-1117 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lawrence C. Dodd
Keyword(s):  
Party System ◽  
Critical Factor ◽  
Party Systems ◽  
Parliamentary Democracy ◽  
Theoretic Analysis ◽  
Majority Party ◽  
Party Government ◽  
Parliamentary Democracies ◽  
Game Theoretic Analysis ◽  
Game Theoretic

This study focuses on A. Lawrence Lowell's classic thesis that a parliamentary democracy must possess a majority party system if durable cabinets are to exist. The argument of this study is that majority party government is not essential to cabinet durability. Rather, in line with the British analyst W. L. Middleton as well as more contemporary game-theoreticians, the critical factor is held to be the coalitional status of the cabinet: (1) cabinets of minimum winning status should be durable; as cabinets depart from minimum winning status, cabinet durability decreases; (2) the coalitional status of the cabinet that forms is partially a product of party system fractionalization, instability, and polarization. Hypotheses derived from the theory are tested with data drawn from 17 Western parliamentary democracies, from 1918 to 1940 and from 1945 to 1970. The findings generally support the theory. A key to durable government is the minimum winning status of the cabinet. Minimum winning cabinets are possible in multiparty and majority party systems.

scholarly journals A game theoretic approach reveals that discretizing clinical information can reduce antibiotic misuse

2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Maya Diamant ◽  
Shoham Baruch ◽  
Eias Kassem ◽  
Khitam Muhsen ◽  
Dov Samet ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Antibiotic Prescription ◽  
Clinical Information ◽  
Social Optimum ◽  
Theoretic Approach ◽  
Theoretic Analysis ◽  
Game Theoretic Analysis ◽  
Optimal Output ◽  
The Social ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Approach

AbstractThe overuse of antibiotics is exacerbating the antibiotic resistance crisis. Since this problem is a classic common-goods dilemma, it naturally lends itself to a game-theoretic analysis. Hence, we designed a model wherein physicians weigh whether antibiotics should be prescribed, given that antibiotic usage depletes its future effectiveness. The physicians’ decisions rely on the probability of a bacterial infection before definitive laboratory results are available. We show that the physicians’ equilibrium decision rule of antibiotic prescription is not socially optimal. However, we prove that discretizing the information provided to physicians can mitigate the gap between their equilibrium decisions and the social optimum of antibiotic prescription. Despite this problem’s complexity, the effectiveness of the discretization solely depends on the type of information available to the physician to determine the nature of infection. This is demonstrated on theoretic distributions and a clinical dataset. Our results provide a game-theory based guide for optimal output of current and future decision support systems of antibiotic prescription.

A Game-theoretic Analysis of Hybrid Threats

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-16
Author(s):  
Pieter Balcaen ◽  
Cind Du Bois ◽  
Caroline Buts
Keyword(s):  
Theoretic Analysis ◽  
Game Theoretic Analysis ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Hybrid Threats
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