A Beginning Theory of Action for Community Analysts based on Group Observation, Theories of the Unconscious, and Evolutionary Psychology

2013 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 199-209
Author(s):  
Marie G. Rudden ◽  
Stuart W. Twemlow
2003 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 195-212 ◽  
Author(s):  
Petteri Pietikainen

C. G. Jung's name has recently been connected with neo-Darwinian theories. One major reason for this connection is that Jungian psychology is based on the suggestion that there exists a universal structure of the mind that has its own evolutionary history. On this crucial point, Jungians and neo-Darwinian evolutionary psychologists agree. However, it will be argued in this paper that, although Jungian psychology opposes the tabula rasa doctrine (mind as a blank slate), Jung cannot be regarded as the founding father of evolutionary psychology. From the scientific perspective, Jung's biological assumptions are simply untenable and have been for many decades. In his attempt to fuse biology, spirit, and the unconscious, Jung ended in speculative flights of imagination that bear no resemblance to modern neo-Darwinian theories. The premise of the paper is that, when Jungian psychology is presented to us as a scientific psychology that has implications for the development of neo-Darwinian psychology, we should be on guard and examine the evidence.


2019 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 51-67
Author(s):  
Bruce J. MacLennan

Abstract The worldview emerging from neurophenomenology is consistent with the phenomenological insights obtained by Neoplatonic theurgical operations. For example, gods and daimons are phenomenologically equivalent to the archetypes and complexes investigated in Jungian psychology and explicated by evolutionary psychology. Jung understood the unconscious mind and physical reality to have a common root in an unus mundus (with physical and psychical aspects). Parallel reductions in the phenomenological and neurological domain imply elementary constituents of consciousness associated with simple physical systems, that is, natural processes experienced both externally (objectively) and internally (subjectively). Analysis reveals they have both an eternal formal structure and a material substrate that allows the formal structure to evolve in time with both phenomenal and physical aspects. Since all physical processes fit this description, a form of panpsychism is implied. These developments can inform our understanding of the Forms, the World Soul, and individual souls in Neoplatonism.


Philosophy ◽  
1980 ◽  
Vol 55 (214) ◽  
pp. 485-496
Author(s):  
R. A. Sharpe

Freud seems to have been torn between a literary and a scientific model for his enterprises. On the one hand he stresses the scientific nature of his researches to an extent which makes the suspicious reader wonder whether he protests too much. On the other hand it is well known that he regarded many writers, though predominantly Shakespeare, as anticipating his findings on the unconscious. In one famous passage in the Introductory Lectures on Psycho-analysis he places his discovery of the unconscious on a par with the discoveries of Darwin and Copernicus in their effect upon man's picture of himself. He is justified, of course, and if we add Marx to this triumvirate we add a figure even closer to Freud in claiming a scientific status for his work, a scientific status which is, to the uncommitted, dubious. Theodore Mischel argues that Freud increasingly construes neurotic behaviour upon the model of ordinary intentional behaviour and, though he continued to show interest in the view that the unconscious impulses which are repressed are physiological in nature, this ideal of a reduction of the psychological to the physiological became a less active ingredient in his published work as his collaboration with Fliess receded into the past. So although he may have paid lip service to some form of psycho-physical identity, believing that mental phenomena are ultimately no more or less than physical happenings in the neurones of the brain, in mature Freud this seems to have been an idly spinning wheel. Roy Schafer has recently pointed out that many of Freud's followers use the concepts of natural science (force, energy and discharge, etc.), whilst simultaneously retaining traces of anthropomorphism in their metapsychology. For instance Heinz Hartmann emphasizes the concept of a ‘higher organizing function’ which resists formulation in the mechanistic metapsychology he favours. Similar difficulties obtrude in the work of Waelder and Kohut. The significance of these conflicts leads Schafer to frame basic Freudian insights in terms of the theory of action, stressing the manner in which an action may be described in differing ways and thus allowing us to present the fact that a patient's behaviour may both tell and not tell us of his deepest anxieties. Yet curiously Schafer denies that freedom plays any part in his account whereas we would have expected a concept so central to agency to have an equally central role in any recasting of psycho-analysis in terms of the theory of action.


2019 ◽  
Vol 42 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Benjamin Badcock ◽  
Axel Constant ◽  
Maxwell James Désormeau Ramstead

Abstract Cognitive Gadgets offers a new, convincing perspective on the origins of our distinctive cognitive faculties, coupled with a clear, innovative research program. Although we broadly endorse Heyes’ ideas, we raise some concerns about her characterisation of evolutionary psychology and the relationship between biology and culture, before discussing the potential fruits of examining cognitive gadgets through the lens of active inference.


2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
George Ellis ◽  
Mark Solms

2010 ◽  
Vol 24 (2) ◽  
pp. 76-82 ◽  
Author(s):  
Martin M. Monti ◽  
Adrian M. Owen

Recent evidence has suggested that functional neuroimaging may play a crucial role in assessing residual cognition and awareness in brain injury survivors. In particular, brain insults that compromise the patient’s ability to produce motor output may render standard clinical testing ineffective. Indeed, if patients were aware but unable to signal so via motor behavior, they would be impossible to distinguish, at the bedside, from vegetative patients. Considering the alarming rate with which minimally conscious patients are misdiagnosed as vegetative, and the severe medical, legal, and ethical implications of such decisions, novel tools are urgently required to complement current clinical-assessment protocols. Functional neuroimaging may be particularly suited to this aim by providing a window on brain function without requiring patients to produce any motor output. Specifically, the possibility of detecting signs of willful behavior by directly observing brain activity (i.e., “brain behavior”), rather than motoric output, allows this approach to reach beyond what is observable at the bedside with standard clinical assessments. In addition, several neuroimaging studies have already highlighted neuroimaging protocols that can distinguish automatic brain responses from willful brain activity, making it possible to employ willful brain activations as an index of awareness. Certainly, neuroimaging in patient populations faces some theoretical and experimental difficulties, but willful, task-dependent, brain activation may be the only way to discriminate the conscious, but immobile, patient from the unconscious one.


1996 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 51-55 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maria Materska

Tadeusz Tomaszewski, born in 1910, graduate of the Jan Kazimierz University, Lvov, doctor honoris causa of Marja Sklodowska-Curie University, Lublin, is an exceptional figure in the history of Polish psychology. His scientific accomplishments and organizational talents, multipled by the achievements of his students, had a decisive impact on the shape and prestige of Polish psychology among other scientific disciplines and determined the rank of Polish psychology in the international arena.


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