Slate of Candidates and Voting Procedures

AORN Journal ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 115 (1) ◽  
pp. 12-12
Author(s):  
Lindsey Christopher
Keyword(s):  
1962 ◽  
Vol 1 (3) ◽  
pp. 219-223
Author(s):  
Stanley Henig
Keyword(s):  

1988 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 140-141 ◽  
Author(s):  
Neil R. Paine
Keyword(s):  

This Comment proposes a new procedure for selecting a single winner in a multicandidate election. This procedure may be viewed as an offspeing of two other procedures which have been recently analysed in this journal.


1995 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 91-98 ◽  
Author(s):  
Amartya Sen

This symposium on voting procedures presents many interesting findings and insights. This note scrutinizes them and discusses two general issues. First, the assumption that voters’ preferences are menu-independent (and based on one canonical ordering of the alternatives) underestimates the importance of the process of voting (voting for x, against y). Second, evaluation can be a two-way process, including the axiomatic method (of social choice theory), going from isolated properties to voting schemes, and the converse method of first identifying attractions and perversities of particular voting schemes (as in this symposium) and then using properties for later axiomatic use.


2000 ◽  
Vol 03 (01n04) ◽  
pp. 181-194 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dominique Lepelley ◽  
Ahmed Louichi ◽  
Fabrice Valognes

All voting procedures are susceptible to give rise, if not to paradoxes, at least to violations of some democratic principles. In this paper, we evaluate and compare the propensity of various voting rules -belonging to the class of scoring rules- to satisfy two versions of the majority principle. We consider the asymptotic case where the numbers of voters tends to infinity and, for each rule, we study with the help of Monte Carlo methods how this propensity varies as a function of the number of candidates.


Author(s):  
Patrick R. Laughlin

This chapter discusses social choice theory, an axiomatic and deductive approach to societal problem solving by existing or possible voting procedures. Social choice theory in economics and political science considers how the members of a society such as voters or policy makers may make societal decisions such as selection among competing candidates to office or policies by existing or possible voting systems. Thus, social combination models and social choice theory address the same basic issue: the aggregation of group member preferences to a collective group response. As a historical example, the representatives from the American colonies who met at the Constitutional Convention of 1787 faced a multitude of judgmental issues on the composition, powers, and procedures of their government. Over four months, they achieved consensus on the U.S. Constitution. Once this consensus on judgmental issues was achieved, the U.S. Constitution became a conceptual system and guide for group problem solving for subsequent generations of Americans.


Author(s):  
Heath Brown

This chapter operationalizes the grounded theoretical model discussed in the previous chapter with an empirical measurement of the various factors it focuses on. It explains the survey methodology used to field a questionnaire to eleven hundred nonprofit organizations in the six states, then analyzes the data collected from survey respondents with a particular focus on the first part of the theory of immigrant-serving nonprofit engagement. The evidence shows that aspects of mission, organizational resources, and policy relate to which electoral tactics an immigrant-serving nonprofit makes use of. Most significantly, the new law to tighten voting procedures in Florida reduced the likelihood that organizations in that state held voter registration drives.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document