scholarly journals From the archive: ‘Can fabricated evidence induce false eyewitness testimony?’ by K. A. Wade, S. L. Green, & R. A. Nash (2010). Applied Cognitive Psychology, 24, 899-908 with commentary

2011 ◽  
Vol 25 (S1) ◽  
pp. S272-S282 ◽  
Author(s):  
2018 ◽  
Vol 16 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 136-155
Author(s):  
Richard Bauckham

New Testament scholars who have some acquaintance with the cognitive psychology of memory have tended to conclude that memory is generally unreliable. Research in cognitive psychology does not support that view. These New Testament scholars have been misled especially by failure to distinguish different types of memory, by relying heavily on study of eyewitness testimony in court (a special category from which it is not legitimate to draw broader conclusions), and by misunderstanding the deliberate focus on the failures of memory in much of the research (which is not because failures are common but because failures are interesting). For research in this field to be useful in the study of the Gospels, we need to distinguish personal event memory from other types and to specify the conditions under which this type of memory tends to be either accurate or misleading.


2010 ◽  
Vol 15 (3) ◽  
pp. 193-201 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elisabeth Norman

A series of vignette examples taken from psychological research on motivation, emotion, decision making, and attitudes illustrates how the influence of unconscious processes is often measured in a range of different behaviors. However, the selected studies share an apparent lack of explicit operational definition of what is meant by consciousness, and there seems to be substantial disagreement about the properties of conscious versus unconscious processing: Consciousness is sometimes equated with attention, sometimes with verbal report ability, and sometimes operationalized in terms of behavioral dissociations between different performance measures. Moreover, the examples all seem to share a dichotomous view of conscious and unconscious processes as being qualitatively different. It is suggested that cognitive research on consciousness can help resolve the apparent disagreement about how to define and measure unconscious processing, as is illustrated by a selection of operational definitions and empirical findings from modern cognitive psychology. These empirical findings also point to the existence of intermediate states of conscious awareness, not easily classifiable as either purely conscious or purely unconscious. Recent hypotheses from cognitive psychology, supplemented with models from social, developmental, and clinical psychology, are then presented all of which are compatible with the view of consciousness as a graded rather than an all-or-none phenomenon. Such a view of consciousness would open up for explorations of intermediate states of awareness in addition to more purely conscious or purely unconscious states and thereby increase our understanding of the seemingly “unconscious” aspects of mental life.


1981 ◽  
Vol 36 (10) ◽  
pp. 1181-1189 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert J. Sternberg
Keyword(s):  

1982 ◽  
Vol 37 (5) ◽  
pp. 592-593
Author(s):  
Leroy H. Pelton

2001 ◽  
Vol 56 (5) ◽  
pp. 405-416 ◽  
Author(s):  
Saul M. Kassin ◽  
V. Anne Tubb ◽  
Harmon M. Hosch ◽  
Amina Memon

1975 ◽  
Vol 20 (6) ◽  
pp. 504-505
Author(s):  
D. JAMES DOOLING
Keyword(s):  

1975 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 118-120
Author(s):  
RACHEL JOFFE FALMAGNE
Keyword(s):  

1995 ◽  
Vol 40 (3) ◽  
pp. 285-285
Author(s):  
Terri Gullickson
Keyword(s):  

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