Financial Reporting Fraud and the Capital Markets

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine the role of state ownership on financial reporting quality regarding the characteristics of conservatism and earnings management. Design/methodology/approach Using a large sample of public and private European firms during the period 2003-2010, the authors test the hypotheses following Ball and Shivakumar’s (2005) model for conservatism and the modified Jones (1991) model proposed by Dechow and Sloan (1995) for earnings management. To ensure that the results are robust, the authors conduct sensitivity analysis with regard to potential endogeneity and selection bias. Findings The authors find that state-owned firms are less conservative than non-state-owned firms, which is consistent with the idea that there is less need for accounting conservatism due to government protection. The authors also show that capital markets play an important role in shaping the relation between state ownership and earnings management. Among public firms, the authors find that state-owned firms have higher abnormal accruals and worse accruals quality than non-state-owned firms, which suggests that state-owned firms are not immune to capital market pressures. Research limitations/implications The study has two limitations. First, as state-owned and non-state-owned firms face quite different incentive structures, management behavior might be determined by factors that have yet to be identified. Second, prior research results suggest an inverted U-shape relation between ownership concentration and earnings management (Ding et al., 2007). It would be interesting to investigate the impact of different levels of state ownership on earnings quality. Practical implications As the paper investigates the role of state ownership on earnings quality using a sample of European firms, it brings new insights regarding the role of state ownership in accounting quality and firm performance. In addition, it considers the role of capital markets in the relation between the quality of financial reporting and ownership by considering a sample with both public and private firms. Originality/value The study contributes to the debate about state intervention in the corporate sector, by extending the knowledge of the effects of government ownership on earnings quality by using a large sample of European firms. Furthermore, the authors also introduce the effect of capital market forces on managers’ behavior in state-owned and non-state-owned companies by analyzing private and publicly listed firms.

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Financial Reporting Fraud: Public and Private Companies

Journal of Forensic Accounting Research ◽

10.2308/jfar-51475 ◽

2016 ◽

Vol 1 (1) ◽

pp. A27-A41 ◽

Cited By ~ 9

Author(s):

A. Scott Fleming ◽

Dana R. Hermanson ◽

Mary-Jo Kranacher ◽

Richard A. Riley

Keyword(s):

Financial Reporting ◽

Primary Objective ◽

Private Company ◽

Private Companies ◽

Public And Private ◽

Public Companies ◽

Multivariate Tests ◽

Public Company ◽

Public Versus Private ◽

Financial Reporting Fraud

ABSTRACT This study uses survey data gathered by the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE) and provided to the Institute for Fraud Prevention (IFP) to examine differences in the profile of financial reporting fraud (FRF) between private companies and public companies. Although private companies represent a significant portion of the economy, largely due to lack of data on these companies, most research on FRF examines only public companies. The primary objective of this study is to determine how private company FRF is different from FRF in public companies. Our multivariate tests reveal that public companies have stronger anti-fraud environments, are more likely to have frauds that involve timing differences, tend to experience larger frauds, have frauds that involve a larger number of perpetrators, and are less likely to have frauds that are discovered by accident. Overall, it appears that the stronger anti-fraud environment in public companies leads public company FRF perpetrators to use less obvious fraud methods (i.e., timing differences) and to involve larger fraud teams to circumvent the controls. These public company frauds are larger than in private companies, and their larger size may make them more likely to be detected through formal means, rather than by accident. Based on the results, we encourage auditors and others to be particularly attuned to the unique risks of the public versus private setting.

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Application of Fuzzy Logic to Fraud Detection

Encyclopedia of Information Science and Technology, First Edition ◽

10.4018/978-1-59140-553-5.ch026 ◽

2005 ◽

pp. 135-139

Author(s):

Mary Jane Lenard ◽

Pervaiz Alam

Keyword(s):

Financial Reporting ◽

Average Cost ◽

Medical Insurance ◽

Financial Statements ◽

Third Party ◽

Insurance Fraud ◽

Fraudulent Financial Reporting ◽

The Cost ◽

The U.S ◽

Financial Reporting Fraud

In light of recent reporting of the failures of some of the major publicly-held companies in the U.S. (e.g., Enron & WorldCom), it has become increasingly important that management, auditors, analysts, and regulators be able to assess and identify fraudulent financial reporting. The Enron and WorldCom failures illustrate that financial reporting fraud could have disastrous consequences both for stockholders and employees. These recent failures have not only adversely affected the U.S. accounting profession but have also raised serious questions about the credibility of financial statements. KPMG (2003) reports seven broad categories of fraud experienced by U.S. businesses and governments: employee fraud (60%), consumer fraud (32%), third-party fraud (25%), computer crime (18%), misconduct (15%), medical/insurance fraud (12%), and financial reporting fraud (7%). Even though it occurred with least frequency, the average cost of financial reporting fraud was the highest, at $257 million, followed by the cost of medical/insurance fraud (average cost of $33.7 million).

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