Turbidity Current Dynamics: 1. Model Formulation and Identification of Flow Equilibrium Conditions Resulting From Flow Stripping and Overspill

2018 ◽  
Vol 123 (3) ◽  
pp. 501-519 ◽  
Author(s):  
M. M. Traer ◽  
A. Fildani ◽  
O. Fringer ◽  
T. McHargue ◽  
G. E. Hilley
2012 ◽  
Vol 232 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ernst Helmstädter

SummaryBased on the original version of Stützel’s habilitation thesis, a so far neglected issue of circular flow equilibrium is considered: the microeconomic transactions during the production period of the neoclassical model of general equilibrium. The specific equilibrium conditions for the „transactions profiles‘‘ are analyzed given the institutional rules of Fisher’s Quantity Equation. The implications for the equilibrium with respect to Stützel’s notions of „lock-step with constant steps‘‘ and „buying lead with constant steps‘‘ are also derived.


2011 ◽  
pp. 65-87 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. Rubinstein

The article considers some aspects of the patronized goods theory with respect to efficient and inefficient equilibria. The author analyzes specific features of patronized goods as well as their connection with market failures, and conjectures that they are related to the emergence of Pareto-inefficient Nash equilibria. The key problem is the analysis of the opportunities for transforming inefficient Nash equilibrium into Pareto-optimal Nash equilibrium for patronized goods by modifying the institutional environment. The paper analyzes social motivation for institutional modernization and equilibrium conditions in the generalized Wicksell-Lindahl model for patronized goods. The author also considers some applications of patronized goods theory to social policy issues.


2018 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 21-37
Author(s):  
Bharat P. Bhatta

This paper analyzes and synthesizes the fundamentals of discrete choice models. This paper alsodiscusses the basic concept and theory underlying the econometrics of discrete choice, specific choicemodels, estimation method, model building and tests, and applications of discrete choice models. Thiswork highlights the relationship between economic theory and discrete choice models: how economictheory contributes to choice modeling and vice versa. Keywords: Discrete choice models; Random utility maximization; Decision makers; Utility function;Model formulation


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Liman Hou ◽  
Marta Dueñas-Diez ◽  
Rohit Srivastava ◽  
Juan Perez-Mercader

<p></p><p>Belousov-Zhabotinsky (B-Z) reaction driven polymerization-induced self-assembly (PISA), or B-Z PISA, is a novel method for the autonomous one-pot synthesis of polymer vesicles from a macroCTA (macro chain transfer agent) and monomer solution (“soup”) containing the above and the BZ reaction components. In it, the polymerization is driven (and controlled) by periodically generated radicals generated in the oscillations of the B-Z reaction. These are inhibitor/activator radicals for the polymerization. Until now B-Z PISA has only been carried out in batch reactors. In this manuscript we present the results of running the system using a continuously stirred tank reactor (CSTR) configuration which offers some interesting advantages.Indeed, by controlling the CSTR parameters we achieve reproducible and simultaneous control of the PISA process and of the properties of the oscillatory cargo encapsulated in the resulting vesicles. Furthermore, the use of flow chemistry enables a more precise morphology control and chemical cargo tuning. Finally, in the context of biomimetic applications a CSTR operation mimics more closely the open non-equilibrium conditions of living systems and their surrounding environments.</p><p></p>


Author(s):  
Randall G. Holcombe

Despite massive worldwide growth of government in the twentieth century, there have been periods in the U.S. and other countries when growth has slowed or reversed. Government growth is not inevitable. Explanations of government growth fall into three major categories. Path-dependent theories emphasize factors that continually push the size of government up, so the current size is in part a function of its past size. Theories about the equilibrium size of government explain why government is big, but not why government grows. If equilibrium conditions change, that can produce government growth. Theories also describe ideological shifts that cause people to want, or at least accept, bigger governments. All these explanations could have an effect on government growth. However, none appears to be persuasive enough to explain all the growth that occurred.


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