How We Do What We Want: A Neuro-Cognitive Perspective on Human Action Planning

Action Co-representation is Tuned to Other Humans

Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience ◽

10.1162/jocn.2008.20144 ◽

2008 ◽

Vol 20 (11) ◽

pp. 2015-2024 ◽

Cited By ~ 105

Author(s):

Chia-Chin Tsai ◽

Wen-Jui Kuo ◽

Daisy L. Hung ◽

Ovid J. L. Tzeng

Keyword(s):

Motor System ◽

Simon Task ◽

Action Observation ◽

Action Planning ◽

Human Action ◽

Coding System ◽

Common Coding ◽

Intentional Behavior ◽

Human Motor ◽

The Common

The present study attempts to explore the process by which knowledge of another's intentional behavior in a joint-action scenario is represented through the action observation and execution network—also known as the common coding system. Participants (n = 18) were instructed to perform the complementary social Simon task under the implemented belief of interaction with either an unseen human (biological agent) or a computer program, where in fact, all response sequences from either “partner” were generated by computer. Results provide behavioral and neurophysiological evidence (P3 and S-LRP) that the believed intentionality of another person's actions is sufficient to facilitate a strong-enough agency-dependent social Simon effect to modulate action planning and anticipation. We suggest that the co-representation of human action may be an evolved biologically tuned default of the human motor system.

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Planning and Representing Intentional Action

The Scientific World JOURNAL ◽

10.1100/tsw.2003.46 ◽

2003 ◽

Vol 3 ◽

pp. 593-608 ◽

Cited By ~ 29

Author(s):

Bernhard Hommel

Keyword(s):

Action Planning ◽

Human Action ◽

Action Control ◽

Fine Tuning ◽

Action Plans ◽

Motor Processing ◽

General Goal ◽

Action Networks ◽

Bidirectional Associations ◽

The One

This paper reviews recent approaches to human action planning and the cognitive representation of intentional actions. Evidence suggests that action planning takes place in terms of anticipated features of the intended goal, that is, in terms of action effects. These effects are acquired from early infancy on by registering contingencies between movements and perceptual movement outcomes. Co-occurrence of movements and effects leads to the creation of bidirectional associations between the underlying internal codes, thus establishing distributed perception-action networks subserving both perceiving external events and intentionally producing them. Action plans determine only the general, goal-relevant features of intended actions, while the fine-tuning is left to on-line sensory-motor processing. Action plans emerge from competition for action control between several factors: overlearned habits, perceptual events, and emotional influences, among others. Accordingly, action control represents a balance between personal intentions and wishes on the one hand and environmental affordances and demands on the other.

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Planning and the neurotechnology of social behaviour

International Journal of Cognition and Technology ◽

10.1075/ijct.1.2.03mee ◽

2002 ◽

Vol 1 (2) ◽

pp. 233-274

Author(s):

Suzanne Meenan ◽

Roger Lindsay

Keyword(s):

Prefrontal Cortex ◽

Social Competence ◽

Social Behaviour ◽

Brain Area ◽

Action Planning ◽

Human Action ◽

Planning System ◽

Action Plans ◽

Cognitive Technology ◽

Action Sequences

The human brain has a remarkable ability to generate plans for sequences of actions that allow human agents to co-operate with and to manipulate the behaviour of others. It is widely claimed that the operations underlying plan developments, behaviour sequencing and inhibition of inappropriate responses to the environment are carried out in the prefrontal cortex. This implies that the prefrontal cortex is a natural system with the capacity to utilise cognitive technology. The present paper argues that social competence is a manifestation of action planning in which other agents feature as plan elements. Accordingly, plans that involve other agents are expected to be more complex than plans which do not. In the light of evidence that negative information makes particularly heavy processing demands, social judgements involving prohibition or unacceptability are expected to create most difficulty for the human action planning system. These assumptions were tested by measuring the ability of patients with prefrontal injuries to detect anomalous action sequences, using a specially constructed Action Acceptability Test. It was hypothesised that if the frontal lobes play a major role in action planning, patients with frontal lobe injuries should show impaired ability to detect faulty action plans, particularly when such plans relate to complex social action sequences, and action sequences involving unacceptable behaviours. The hypotheses were generally supported as frontal-injury patients proved to be worse at detecting both complex social sequences and deviant action sequences than participants with non-frontal injuries and normal control participants. The results of the study are consistent with the view that human social competence results from the cognitive processes associated with action planning and the data also supports the claim that action planning processes are specifically disrupted by damage to the prefrontal cortex. The findings provide some confirmation for the Cognitive Technology perspective, in that action planning does seem to be physically associated with a specific brain area, and including social agents and deviations from acceptability in action plans do seem to be manipulations that operate to make action plans more difficult to process, hence causing more errors in individuals with damage to the prefrontal cortex. The results also provide some encouragement for the belief that new cognitive tools can be constructed that link brain processes to other levels of description, such as social behaviour. The Action Acceptability Test, a prognostic tool developed to predict the social competence of frontal-injury patients, is offered as one such example.

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