Nuclear Power Plant Emergency Preparedness: Results From an Evaluation of Michigan's Potassium Iodide Distribution Program

2012 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 263-269 ◽  
Author(s):  
Laura R. Zwolinski ◽  
Martha Stanbury ◽  
Susan Manente
Keyword(s):  
Power Plant ◽  
Nuclear Power Plant ◽  
Potassium Iodide ◽  
Emergency Preparedness ◽  
Nuclear Power ◽  
Power Plants ◽  
Body Part ◽  
Emergency Planning ◽  
Telephone Surveys ◽  
Fukushima Daiichi

ABSTRACTBackground: In 2009, the Michigan Department of Community Health (MDCH) made potassium iodide (KI), a nonprescription radio-protective drug, available by mailing vouchers redeemable at local pharmacies for KI tablets, at no cost to residents living within 10 miles of Michigan's 3 nuclear power plants (NPPs). MDCH conducted an evaluation of this program to determine Michigan's KI coverage and to assess general emergency preparedness among residents living near the NPPs.Methods: KI coverage was estimated based on redeemed voucher counts and the 2010 Census. Telephone surveys were administered to a random sample (N = 153) of residents living near Michigan's NPPs to evaluate general emergency preparedness, reasons for voucher use or nonuse, and KI knowledge.Results: Only 5.3% of eligible residences redeemed KI vouchers. Most surveyed residents (76.5%) were aware of living near an NPP, yet 42.5% reported doing “nothing” to plan for an emergency. Almost half of surveyed voucher users did not know when to take KI or which body part KI protects. Among voucher nonusers, 48.0% were either unaware of the program or did not remember receiving a voucher.Conclusions: Additional efforts are needed to ensure that all residents are aware of the availability of KI and that recipients of the drug understand when and why it should be taken. Minimal emergency planning among residents living near Michigan's NPPs emphasizes the need for increased emergency preparedness and awareness. Findings are particularly salient given the March 2011 Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant emergency in Japan.(Disaster Med Public Health Preparedness. 2012;6:263–269)

Memories from the Abyss

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Naoto Kan ◽  
Jeffrey S. Irish
Keyword(s):  
Power Plant ◽  
Nuclear Power Plant ◽  
Emergency Preparedness ◽  
Disaster Response ◽  
Nuclear Power ◽  
Industrial Safety ◽  
Response Team ◽  
Japanese Prime Minister ◽  
Fukushima Daiichi ◽  
Nuclear Emergency

This chapter presents Japanese Prime Minister Naoto Kan's recollections about the week immediately following the Great East Japan earthquake. Topics discussed include the response team meeting at the Emergency Disaster Response Headquarters; the Act on Special Measures Concerning Nuclear Emergency Preparedness; the declaration of a nuclear emergency; whether the state has authority over TEPCO's Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant; the responsibilities of the Nuclear Safety Commission and Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency; TEPCO's inability to resolve problems on their own; the evacuation of residents with within a three-kilometer [1.9 mile] radius of the nuclear power plant; and Kan's decision to address the Japanese people a day and a half after the earthquake.

Nuclear Power Plant Fires and Explosions: Part II — Hydrogen Ignition Overview

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert A. Leishear
Keyword(s):  
Power Plant ◽  
Nuclear Power Plant ◽  
Nuclear Power ◽  
Power Plants ◽  
Water Hammer ◽  
Hydrogen Gas ◽  
Direct Result ◽  
Plant Safety ◽  
Hydrogen Ignition ◽  
Fukushima Daiichi

Major accidents that were affected by hydrogen fires and explosions included Chernobyl, Three Mile Island, and Fukushima Daiichi. Smaller piping explosions have occurred at Hamaoka and Brunsbüttel Nuclear Power Plants. An overview of pertinent topics is presented here to compare similarities and differences between these accidents. In particular, a hydrogen ignition mechanism is presented here, where fluid transients, or water hammer, may cause pressures to compress flammable hydrogen gas in reactor systems. As the gas compresses, it heats to temperatures sufficient to cause autoignition, or dieseling. Autoignition then leads to fires or explosions in nuclear power plant systems. To explain this evolving theory on hydrogen ignition during fires and explosions, various nuclear power plant hydrogen accidents require discussion. For example, Chernobyl explosions were unaffected by water hammer, while a Three Mile Island hydrogen fire was a direct result of water hammer following a reactor meltdown, and explosions that followed a meltdown at Fukushima Daiichi occurred during a water hammer event. Other piping damages also occurred during water hammer events. The primary purpose of this paper is to serve as a literature review of past accidents and to provide new insights into those accidents. In short, what is known versus what is unknown is discussed here with respect to the ignition sources of nuclear power plant fires and explosions. How can nuclear power plant safety be assured unless previous fire and explosion causes are understood? Prior to this work, they were not understood.

Study on Emergency Planning Zone Determination for CAP200 Small Modular Reactor

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wang Xuan ◽  
Du Fenglei ◽  
Sun Dawei ◽  
Tang Te
Keyword(s):  
Power Plant ◽  
Nuclear Power Plant ◽  
Nuclear Power ◽  
Power Plants ◽  
Nuclear Power Plants ◽  
Source Term ◽  
Meteorological Data ◽  
Emergency Planning ◽  
Constraint Factor ◽  
Study Sites

Determination of the SMR emergency planning zone (EPZ) is one of the important external constraint factor of its marketing and application, which means that it is very important to formulate appropriate classification criteria and establish proper size range. In China, due to the requirement of “Criteria for emergency planning and preparedness for nuclear power plants: Part 1, The dividing of emergency planning zone.” (GB/T 17680.1-2008), for PWR nuclear power plant, its external plume EPZ should be within 7km–10km, and its internal plume EPZ should be within 3km∼5km. However, the scope of the standard for the emergency planning area is currently limited to conventional nuclear power plants, and for the current SMR, its emergency planning size is not included. In this paper, we will analyze the classification method of SMR EPZ based on the traditional Nuclear Power Plants feedback experience, including selection of source term, accident cutoff probability, determination method of the plume EPZ and the ingestion EPZ. Three typical nuclear power plant sites in China are chosen as CAP200 case study sites, including two inland nuclear power plant sites and one coastal site. The three sites can represent most of the meteorological and terrain characters of China nuclear power plants. According to the CAP200 source term and meteorological data of the sites, MACCS2 computer program is used to calculate the severe accidents consequence. Conclusions show that for the CAP200 SMR, the accident cutoff probability can be 1.0E−08 to 1.0E−07 per reactor per year, and its project dose exceeding probability in the three sites boundary is far below 30%, which directs that for CAP200 SMR, its plume and ingestion emergence planning zone is limited to the on-site area, and its off-site emergency response can be simplified.

Fuzzy multi-objective decision making approach for nuclear power plant installation

2020 ◽  
Vol 39 (5) ◽  
pp. 6339-6350
Author(s):  
Esra Çakır ◽  
Ziya Ulukan
Keyword(s):  
Linear Programming ◽  
Power Plant ◽  
Nuclear Power Plant ◽  
Energy Supply ◽  
Energy Demand ◽  
Nuclear Power ◽  
Power Plants ◽  
Total Duration ◽  
Objective Functions ◽  
Multi Objective

Due to the increase in energy demand, many countries suffer from energy poverty because of insufficient and expensive energy supply. Plans to use alternative power like nuclear power for electricity generation are being revived among developing countries. Decisions for installation of power plants need to be based on careful assessment of future energy supply and demand, economic and financial implications and requirements for technology transfer. Since the problem involves many vague parameters, a fuzzy model should be an appropriate approach for dealing with this problem. This study develops a Fuzzy Multi-Objective Linear Programming (FMOLP) model for solving the nuclear power plant installation problem in fuzzy environment. FMOLP approach is recommended for cases where the objective functions are imprecise and can only be stated within a certain threshold level. The proposed model attempts to minimize total duration time, total cost and maximize the total crash time of the installation project. By using FMOLP, the weighted additive technique can also be applied in order to transform the model into Fuzzy Multiple Weighted-Objective Linear Programming (FMWOLP) to control the objective values such that all decision makers target on each criterion can be met. The optimum solution with the achievement level for both of the models (FMOLP and FMWOLP) are compared with each other. FMWOLP results in better performance as the overall degree of satisfaction depends on the weight given to the objective functions. A numerical example demonstrates the feasibility of applying the proposed models to nuclear power plant installation problem.

Human reliability in non-destructive inspections of nuclear power plant components: modeling and analysis

2019 ◽  
Vol 7 (2B) ◽  
Author(s):  
Vanderley Vasconcelos ◽  
Wellington Antonio Soares ◽  
Raissa Oliveira Marques ◽  
Silvério Ferreira Silva Jr ◽  
Amanda Laureano Raso
Keyword(s):  
Power Plant ◽  
Nuclear Power Plant ◽  
Human Factors ◽  
Nuclear Power ◽  
Power Plants ◽  
Failure Modes ◽  
Cooling System ◽  
Human Reliability ◽  
Non Destructive ◽  
Plant Components

Non-destructive inspection (NDI) is one of the key elements in ensuring quality of engineering systems and their safe use. This inspection is a very complex task, during which the inspectors have to rely on their sensory, perceptual, cognitive, and motor skills. It requires high vigilance once it is often carried out on large components, over a long period of time, and in hostile environments and restriction of workplace. A successful NDI requires careful planning, choice of appropriate NDI methods and inspection procedures, as well as qualified and trained inspection personnel. A failure of NDI to detect critical defects in safety-related components of nuclear power plants, for instance, may lead to catastrophic consequences for workers, public and environment. Therefore, ensuring that NDI is reliable and capable of detecting all critical defects is of utmost importance. Despite increased use of automation in NDI, human inspectors, and thus human factors, still play an important role in NDI reliability. Human reliability is the probability of humans conducting specific tasks with satisfactory performance. Many techniques are suitable for modeling and analyzing human reliability in NDI of nuclear power plant components, such as FMEA (Failure Modes and Effects Analysis) and THERP (Technique for Human Error Rate Prediction). An example by using qualitative and quantitative assessesments with these two techniques to improve typical NDI of pipe segments of a core cooling system of a nuclear power plant, through acting on human factors issues, is presented.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document